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I Need a Doctor: A Critique of Medicare
Financing of Graduate Medical
Education
Stacey A. Tovino*
Abstract
In its broadest sense, this Article examines the complex
relationship between population booms, doctor shortages, and
United States government financing of graduate medical
education (GME). More specifically, this Article argues that
current rules governing the calculation of Medicare payments to
teaching hospitals for the costs of GME are based on cost,
population, and other data that are no longer relevant. As applied,
these formulas discriminate in favor of the nation’s oldest teaching
hospitals, located in New England and the Middle Atlantic, and
against current and future teaching hospitals located in growing
population centers, especially regions in the South and West. To
remedy these inequities, this Article proposes a new structure for
calculating Medicare payments to teaching hospitals that takes
into account current GME costs, population data, and geographic
imbalances in physician and resident supply and distribution.
These proposals are designed to boost residency training in
physician shortage areas and in growing population centers and
improve access to generalist and specialist physicians across the
United States.
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I. Introduction
The United States has thousands of communities that are
plagued by physician shortages.1 In some of these communities,
patients wait months for routine medical appointments.2 Other
1. See Lists of Designated Primary Medical Care, Mental Health, and
Dental Health Professional Shortage Areas, 79 Fed. Reg. 36075, 36075 (June 25,
2014) (referencing the HRSA websites to find areas designated as having
shortages of primary medical and mental care).
2. See, e.g., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE VIRGINIA HEALTH
CARE LANDSCAPE, FACT SHEET 8 (2014), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.word
press.com/2014/05/8592-the-virginia-health-care-landscape.pdf. (reporting that
patients wait up to four months for first-time appointments at free health care
clinics in Virginia); Eli Segall, Doctor Shortage Could Leave Las Vegas in
Critical Condition, VEGAS INC. (Apr. 27, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://www.
vegasinc.com/business/2014/apr/27/critical-doctor-shortage/ (last visited Nov. 18,
2014) (reporting that the Las Vegas physician shortage causes months-long
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patients travel long distances to obtain health care services that
are unavailable or inaccessible in their hometowns.3 Still other
patients wait until they are really sick and then seek care in the
emergency department where they cannot be turned away.4
The nation’s doctor shortages should not come as a surprise.
The United States has a growing population, an aging population,
and an increasing number of residents with health insurance
coverage as a result of the Affordable Care Act.5 The shortages
are especially problematic in the American South and West,6
waits for appointments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See, e.g., Laurence Hammack, Health Care Law Brings More Patients to
Already Strained Doctors, ROANOKE TIMES (Dec. 8, 2013, 6:14 PM),
http://www.roanoke.com/topics/obamacare/article_b33b9c24-6f4c-11e3-92080019bb30f31a.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (reporting the story of Ann
Foster, a resident of rural Highland County, Virginia, who travels three hours
round trip for her doctor appointments) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Shannon Pettypiece, Doctor Shortage Spreading in U.S. Presaged
in Las Vegas, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-22/doctor-shortage-spreading-in-u-s-presaged-inlas-vegas.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (reporting the story of Las Vegas
resident Mary Berg, who moved to Phoenix to obtain cancer care that was
unavailable in Las Vegas) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Jennifer Robison, No Easy Cure for Doctor Deficit in Nevada, LAS
VEGAS REV. J. (Feb. 3, 2013, 1:59 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/
economy/no-easy-cure-doctor-deficit-nevada (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (“As
doctors’ appointment books fill up, more people go where they cannot be turned
away–an emergency room.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
The federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)
requires Medicare-participating hospitals to provide appropriate medical
screening examinations and necessary stabilizing treatment to individuals who
request examination or treatment for a medical condition without regard to the
individual’s ability to pay. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(b) (2012). Hospitals that
violate EMTALA may be subject to civil money penalties and private lawsuits.
Id. § 1395dd(c)(1), (c)(2)(A).
5. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, CRITICAL CONDITION: THE CALL TO INCREASE
GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION FUNDING 1 (2011) (“Many authorities agree that
by 2025 the United States will face a shortage of physicians to meet the needs of
a growing and aging U.S. population.”); Kathleen Haughney, Florida Doesn’t
Have Enough Doctors for Medicaid Expansion, Lobby Group Says, SUN SENTINEL
(Feb. 22, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-02-22/health/fl-doctorshortage-medicaid-expansion-if-florida-20130222_1_medicaid-expansion-newmedicaid-patients-florida-medical-association (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (noting
that the Affordable Care Act’s individual health insurance mandate and
Medicaid expansion are driving demand for physician services) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, S., W. Have Fastest-Growing
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which have experienced higher than average population growth
over the last several decades.7
With the hope of producing physicians who will stay and
practice medicine, many southern and western states have
recently opened or are planning to open new medical schools. In
2009, the University of Central Florida welcomed its first class of
medical students in a new school in Orlando.8 In 2013, the
University of California, Riverside School of Medicine admitted
its first class of medical students.9 In 2015, the Edward Via
College of Osteopathic Medicine will open a new medical campus
in Auburn, Alabama.10 In 2016, the Dell Medical School at The
Cities, Census Bureau Reports; Three of Top 10 Are in Tex. Capital Area (May
22, 2014) (“The South and West dominated the list of fastest-growing
municipalities between 2012 and 2013, claiming all of the top 15, seven of which
were in Texas.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); id. at tbl.1
(referencing states with the fastest growing cities); Samuel Weigley, Alexander
E.M. Hess & Michael B. Sauter, Doctor Shortage Could Take Turn for the Worse,
USA TODAY (Oct. 20, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
business/2012/10/20/doctors-shortage-least-most/1644837/ (last visited Nov. 18,
2014) (discussing physician shortages in states with low physician-to-population
ratios, most of which are located in the South and West) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., CENTER FOR WORKFORCE STUDIES, 2013
STATE PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE DATA BOOK 8–9 (2013) [hereinafter AAMC, 2013
PHYSICIAN DATA BOOK] (reporting the number of active physicians per 100,000
population in each state); id. at 12–13, fig.3 & tbl.3 (reporting the number of
active primary care physicians per 100,000 population in each state); AM. MED.
ASS’N, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. 458 (2014)
[hereinafter, AMA, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS] (reporting the number of
physicians in patient care per 100,000 population in each state).
8. See Marni Johnson, UCF Medical School Graduated Its First Class,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 9, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-0519/news/os-ucf-medical-school-graduates-20130517_1_ucf-medical-school-firstclass-medical-students (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (reporting on the graduation
of UCF’s first medical school class and detailing the institution’s history) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See Kris Lovekin, White Coat Ceremony Launches UC Riverside School
of Medicine, UCR TODAY (Aug. 12, 2013), http://ucrtoday.ucr.edu/16926 (last
visited Nov. 18, 2014) (describing the welcoming ceremonies for the UC
Riverside School of Medicine’s inaugural class) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
10. See VCOM to Accept Student Applications for Auburn Campus, EDWARD
VIA COLL. OF OSTEOPATHIC MED., PROSPECTIVE STUDENTS AND VISITORS,
http://www.vcom.edu/admissions/auburn-info.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
(announcing that the institution has received accreditation and plans to enroll
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University of Texas at Austin is scheduled to admit its first class
of medical students.11 And, in May 2014, the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, appointed a Planning Dean who is
responsible for developing a vision for the UNLV School of
Medicine, which will be the first allopathic medical school in
southern Nevada.12
Even with these new medical schools, states with physician
shortages are severely limited in their ability to retain and train
graduate medical residents, who would be very likely to practice
medicine in that state.13 These limitations exist because Congress
in 1997 permanently capped the number of Medicare-financed
residency slots at the number of residents reported by teaching
hospitals on their 1996 Medicare cost reports.14 These limitations
an inaugural class in 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See Welcome to Dell Medical School, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN,
http://www.utexas.edu/dell-medical-school (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (detailing
the University’s plans for its forthcoming medical school) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See Paul Takahashi, UNLV Taps “Planning Dean” for Proposed
Medical
School,
LAS
VEGAS
SUN
(May
7,
2014,
5:15
PM),
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2014/may/07/unlv-taps-planning-dean-propos
ed-medical-school/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (describing the credentials of
UNLV’s new medical school planning dean and her role in the development of
the new institution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. Physicians who complete both their undergraduate and graduate
medical education in the same state are very likely to stay and practice
medicine in that state. See, e.g., AAMC, 2013 PHYSICIAN DATA BOOK, supra
note 7, at 55 tbl.20 (reporting that 79.1%, of physicians who completed both
their undergraduate and graduate medical educations in Nevada stayed in or
returned to Nevada to practice medicine). Physicians who complete only their
graduate medical education in a state are less likely to stay and practice
medicine in that state. See id. at 53 tbl.19 (reporting that 55.8% of the
physicians who completed their graduate medical education in Nevada stayed in
or returned to Nevada to practice medicine). Physicians who complete only their
undergraduate medical education in a state are even less likely to stay and
practice medicine in that state. See id. at 49 tbl.17 (reporting that only 36.8% of
the physicians who completed their undergraduate medical education in Nevada
stayed in or returned to Nevada to practice medicine).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(4)(F) (2012) (setting out the limitation on
the number of residents in allopathic and osteopathic medicine); 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.79(c)(2)(i) (2013) (restricting hospitals’ resident levels to below their
unweighted FTE counts); Editorial, Bottlenecks in Training Doctors, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2014, at SR10 (“Medical school enrollments and the number of medical
schools have soared over the past decade, statistics show, but the number of
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also exist because the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) in 2012 set the number of years non-rural
teaching hospitals have to grow new medical residency training
programs to an outside limit of five years from the date of the
hospital’s first new medical residency program.15 Unlike many of
the prestigious east coast teaching hospitals, which had decades
to carefully plan and build out multiple specialty training
programs,16 today most new residency programs are forced to
build themselves out as quickly as possible within a five-year
period17 without regard to whether a longer build-out period
would have yielded higher numbers of more desirable residents
and more qualified teaching faculty, a stronger and more efficient
administrative base, and a broader range of higher-quality
specialty training programs.18
This Article challenges these and other rules that govern
Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for the costs associated
with providing graduate medical education (GME). This Article
proceeds as follows: Part II investigates the historical debate
regarding the optimal size and shape of the U.S. physician
workforce.19 Since the middle of the twentieth century, a number
of public and private bodies have assessed the overall number of
physicians in patient care and have offered recommendations
residencies to train graduates has increased only modestly, largely because of a
congressional cap on paying for the slots.”).
15. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1) (2013) (defining the size limits of new
medical residency programs).
16. See, e.g., Fitzhugh Mullan, Candice Chen & Erika Steinmetz, The
Geography of Graduate Medical Education: Imbalances Signal Need for New
Distribution Policies, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1914, 1918 (2013) [hereinafter Mullan
et al., Geography] (noting that residency education took root in the first half of
the twentieth century in the United States Northeast and that “[p]rograms in
these areas were well positioned to take full advantage of Medicare GME as it
developed in the latter part of that century”).
17. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1) (providing that the allocation of residency
positions for new institutions is determined based on its size after five years of
existence). One exception to this general rule is that rural teaching hospitals
have five years from the date of each new residency program (not the hospital’s
first new residency program) for program build out. Id. § 413.79(e)(3).
18. See id. § 413.79(e)(5) (“The cap will not [otherwise] be adjusted for
expansion of existing or previously existing programs.”).
19. Infra Part II.
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that would expand or contract physician supply accordingly.20
Part II reviews these assessments and recommendations and
identifies the current consensus among workforce analysts that
significant shortages of both generalist and specialist physicians
already occur in many geographic areas and that new shortages
will occur in additional areas over the next decade.21 Population
growth, population aging, and the expansion of health insurance
associated with the Affordable Care Act are the three main
factors driving these physician shortages and shortage
projections.22
Part III examines current regional and state physician
workforce data.23 New England and the Middle Atlantic have the
highest total numbers of physicians, physician-to-population
ratios, and resident-to-population ratios in the nation.24 The
South and the West have the lowest total numbers of physicians,
physician-to-population
ratios,
and
resident-to-population
ratios.25 Particular states, including Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, Texas,
Utah, and Wyoming, have exceptionally low total and relative
numbers of generalists and specialists in patient care and
residents training in GME programs.26 Standing alone, however,
this data cannot be interpreted as an oversupply or undersupply
of physicians or as an adequate distribution or maldistribution of
physicians.27 Part III identifies and examines a number of
additional factors that are necessary to consider when making
determinations regarding optimal and equitable physician supply
and distribution.28
Part IV reviews the important relationship between
undergraduate medical education (UME), GME, and physician
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Infra Part III.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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supply and distribution.29 Part IV explains why efforts to remedy
physician shortages should focus not only on expanding or
building new UME schools, which are necessary to prepare
students for later specialty training and are critical in terms of
the nation’s long-term physician supply, but also on expanding or
building new GME programs, which produce fully-trained and
practice-ready physicians who are most likely to stay and work in
the state where they completed both their undergraduate and
graduate medical education.30 Part IV assesses current state data
regarding resident-to-population ratios, ratios of graduate
medical residents to undergraduate medical students, and rates
of physician retention following completion of UME and GME.
Part IV identifies those states in greatest need of expanded or
new GME programs.31
Part V explores the convoluted legal history of Medicare
financing of GME.32 In the early years of the Medicare Program,
from 1966 to 1983, Medicare financed reasonable GME costs
actually incurred by teaching hospitals.33 That is, federal law did
not limit the number of residents whose training costs could be
reimbursed and teaching hospitals located in geographic areas
with low resident-to-population ratios and in physician shortage
areas were able to add residents to existing training programs
and start new training programs without federal constraint.34
Part V further illustrates how Medicare financing of GME
has changed dramatically since the mid-1980s.35 In 1986,
Congress declared that Medicare GME payments would no longer
be based on reasonable costs actually incurred by teaching
hospitals but, instead, on historical costs tied to fiscal year 1984
that are updated for inflation only.36 In 1997, Congress
permanently capped the number of medical residents that could
29. Infra Part IV.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Infra Part V.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 244–49 and accompanying text (describing the switch in
calculating GME aid).
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be counted for purposes of Medicare GME payments to the
number of residents counted on the hospital’s 1996 cost report.37
More recently, in 2012, CMS set the number of years most
teaching hospitals have to grow new medical residency training
programs to an outside limit of five years from the date of the
hospital’s first new medical residency program.38
Part VI argues that current rules governing the calculation of
Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for GME are based on
cost, population, and other data that are no longer relevant.39 As
applied, these formulas discriminate in favor of the nation’s
oldest teaching hospitals, many of which are located in New
England and the Middle Atlantic.40 Teaching hospitals located in
states such as New York, Maryland, Massachusetts, and
Pennsylvania had fully developed GME programs prior to 1984,
the historic base year to which teaching hospitals’ GME costs are
now tied, and prior to 1997, the year in which Congress capped
teaching hospitals’ resident counts.41 That is, most New England
and Middle Atlantic teaching hospitals had achieved substantial,
if not maximum, training and cost capacity when Congress
transitioned from its reasonable cost basis methodology to its
current capped-cost and capped-resident financing formulas.42
One result is that New England and Middle Atlantic teaching
hospitals have comparative advantages in terms of the overall
dollar amount of Medicare GME reimbursement received, the
relative dollar amount of Medicare GME reimbursement received
per state resident, and permissible resident-to-population
ratios.43
Part VI further argues that current formulas used to
calculate Medicare GME payments discriminate against teaching
hospitals located in growing population centers, including many
37. See infra note 280 and accompanying text (describing the impact of the
Balanced Budget Act).
38. Infra note 305 and accompanying text.
39. Infra Part VI.
40. Id.
41. Infra notes 244–49 and accompanying text.
42. Infra Part VI.
43. Id.
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teaching hospitals located in the South and West that were still
building to full capacity in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as future
teaching hospitals that should be built in the South and West due
to significant population growth since the 1980s and 1990s.44 Left
unchanged, these formulas will exacerbate physician shortages
and related health care disparities in areas with low resident-topopulation ratios.45
Part VI proposes that Congress establish a new structure for
calculating Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for the costs
of their GME.46 This structure would take into account current
GME costs, population data, and geographic imbalances in
physician and resident supply and distribution.47 When combined
with proposals set forth in a companion article critiquing state
Medicaid financing of GME,48 the proposals set forth in this
Article will improve access to generalist and specialist physicians
in growing population centers in the United States and will
reduce related geographic health care disparities.
II. The Physician Workforce Debate: A Brief History
The proper size and shape of the United States physician
workforce has been debated for over a century.49 Over the past
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Stacey A. Tovino, A Critique of Medicaid Financing of Graduate
Medical Education (in progress).
49. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS.
ADMIN., GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: A PRIMER 13 (2000)
[hereinafter HHS PRIMER] (referencing the longstanding debate); Adam Berényi,
Preface to PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND xi (Adam Berényi ed., 2010)
[hereinafter Berényi, Preface] (same); ELI GINZBERG, TEACHING HOSPITALS AND
THE URBAN POOR 42 (2000) [hereinafter GINZBERG, TEACHING HOSPITALS]
(examining “the importance of physician supply issues in the evolution of U.S.
health care policy”); Hardy D. Loe, Virginia C. Kennedy & Frank I. Moore, The
Shifting Mosaic of Health and Medical Care in Houston and Harris County,
Texas, in the Late 1980s [hereinafter Loe et al., Shifting Mosaic], in CHANGING
U.S. HEALTH CARE: A STUDY OF FOUR METROPOLITAN AREAS 159, 182 (eds. Eli
Ginzberg, Howard S. Berliner & Miriam Ostow 1993) [hereinafter CHANGING
U.S. HEALTH CARE] (referencing the divided opinion and evidence regarding the
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fifty years, a number of public and private bodies have assessed
the overall number of physicians in patient care across the
United States and have offered recommendations that would
expand or contract physician supply accordingly.50 In the 1950s
and 1960s,51 several public and private bodies began projecting
that the United States would soon suffer a physician shortage.52
In response, the federal government recommended doubling the
output of U.S. medical schools.53 From 1963 to 1976, existing
medical schools expanded their programs and public and private
universities built new UME schools.54 The freshman class at The
Ohio State University College of Medicine, for example, increased
presence or absence of a physician surplus in a particular city, that is, in
Houston, Texas). Debates regarding the appropriate size and shape of the
physician workforce were so frequent in the third quarter of the twentieth
century that analysts named the period from 1955 to 1980 the “Era of Debate
and Funding for Health Manpower.” 1 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REPORT OF THE GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TO THE SECRETARY 39 (Sept. 30, 1980) [hereinafter GMENAC REPORT].
50. See, e.g., John K. Iglehart, The Uncertain Future of Medicare and
Graduate Medical Education, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1340, 1345 (2011)
[hereinafter Iglehart, Uncertain Future] (“The fits and starts of physicianworkforce policy in the United States have been on display during the past
several decades, with warnings of shortages and surpluses at different times.”).
51. See ELI GINZBERG, THE MEDICAL TRIANGLE: PHYSICIANS, POLITICIANS,
AND THE PUBLIC 169–78 (1990) (discussing the history and politics of physician
supply before 1950).
52. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS.
ADMIN., PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND: PROJECTIONS TO 2020, at 2 (2006)
[hereinafter HRSA PROJECTIONS 2006] (“During the 1950s and 1960s, projections
of a growing physician shortage helped motivate an expansion of the Nation’s
medical schools, an increase in government funding for medical education, and
the creation of policies and programs that encouraged immigration of foreigntrained physicians.”).
53. ELI GINZBERG & PANOS MINOGIANNIS, U.S. HEALTH CARE AND THE
FUTURE SUPPLY OF PHYSICIANS 2 (2004) [hereinafter GINZBERG & MINOGIANNIS].
See generally HRSA PROJECTIONS 2006, supra note 52, at 2 (“During the 1950s
and 1960s, projections of a growing physician shortage helped motivate an
expansion of the Nation’s medical schools, an increase in government funding
for medical education, and the creation of policies and programs that
encouraged immigration of foreign-trained physicians.”); Berényi, Preface, supra
note 49, at xii (same).
54. RICHARD M. SCHEFFLER, IS THERE A DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE? MARKET
SIGNALS AND TOMORROW’S SUPPLY OF DOCTORS 11 (2008); see also ELI GINZBERG,
AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE POWER SHIFT 77–79 (1985) (discussing federal and
state support for the expansion of medical education in the 1960s and 1970s).
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its enrollment from 150 medical students in 1963 to 225 medical
students in 1973.55
This expansion-oriented physician supply policy did not last
long. In 1976, the Secretary of the former Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (Secretary) established the Graduate
Medical Education National Advisory Committee (GMENAC).56
Among other responsibilities, GMENAC was charged with
advising the Secretary regarding the number of physicians
required to meet the health care needs of the American public.57
Following a three-year study, GMENAC concluded in 1980 that
the United States would face a surplus of almost 70,000
physicians by 1990, a surplus of 145,000 physicians by the end of
the century, and that most physician specialties would have a
surplus by these dates as well.58 GMENAC therefore
recommended a seventeen percent decrease in medical school
enrollment and “prompt adjustments [to] the number of residency
training positions in individual specialties to bring supply into
balance.”59 Despite the intensity of GMENAC’s recommendations,
they attracted little attention and were largely disregarded by
federal and state policymakers.60
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of other public
and private bodies also projected physician surpluses. Authorized
by Congress in 1986, the Council on Graduate Medical Education
(COGME)61 issued a report in 1994 stating that the United States

55. THOMAS E. WILLIAMS, BHAGWAN SATIANI & E. CHRISTOPHER ELLISON,
THE COMING SHORTAGE OF PHYSICIANS: WHY THEY ARE DISAPPEARING AND WHAT
THAT MEANS FOR OUR HEALTH 2 (2009) [hereinafter THE COMING SHORTAGE].
56. GMENAC REPORT, supra note 49, at 1.
57. See id. (“The research methodology, which consisted of three
mathematical models to project physician supply and requirements, is
described, and 40 recommendations to solve health manpower problems of
1990–2000 are presented.”).
58. Id. at i, 3, 7, 41, 99; see also GINZBERG & MINOGIANNIS, supra note 53, at
2 (discussing the conclusions set forth in the GMENAC Report); GINZBERG,
TEACHING HOSPITALS, supra note 49, at 52–53 (same).
59. GMENAC REPORT, supra note 49, at 99.
60. GINZBERG, TEACHING HOSPITALS, supra note 49, at 53.
61. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., CHARTER 1 (2012).
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had too many specialist physicians.62 COGME recommended that
the number of first-year GME residency positions be limited to
only ten percent more than the number of U.S. medical school
graduates and that at least fifty percent of residency graduates
enter practice as generalist physicians, including family
physicians, general internists, and general pediatricians.63
COGME’s recommendations were oriented towards its stated goal
of producing twenty-five percent fewer physicians per year.64
The following year, the Taskforce on Health Care Workforce
Regulation of the PEW Health Professions Commission released
a report concluding that “[e]ither the U.S. was severely underdoctored in 1970 or it is currently oversupplied.”65 The PEW
Commission proposed two medical education reforms, including
(1) closing UME schools in order to decrease the size of the total
entering medical school class in the United States by twenty to
twenty-five percent; and (2) reducing the number of GME
positions to the number of medical school graduates plus ten
percent.66 Policymakers largely ignored the recommendations of
the PEW Commission as well.67
Notwithstanding the recommendations of GMENAC,
COGME, and the PEW Commission, physician workforce
analysts began singing a different tune after the turn of the
century. Since 2002, at least sixty-two public and private bodies
have issued reports projecting national, state, and specialty62. See COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., FOURTH REPORT TO CONGRESS
AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES SECRETARY:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE THROUGH PHYSICIAN
WORKFORCE REFORM, at v (1994) (“Recent data reinforces the conclusions of the

Council’s Third Report that the nation’s physician workforce is not well-matched
with public needs. Specifically, the nation has too few generalist and minority
physicians, too many specialists, and poor geographic distribution of
physicians.”).
63. Id.
64. See id. (“If COGME’s year 2000 goals were adopted and attained, the
nation would produce 25% fewer physicians annually, of whom at least half
would practice as generalists.”).
65. THE PEW HEALTH PROFS. COMM’N, CRITICAL CHALLENGES: REVITALIZING
THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 30 (1995).
66. Id. at 32 (Recommendations D1 and D2).
67. See GINZBERG, TEACHING HOSPITALS, supra note 49, at 57 (describing
the minimal contemporary political impact of various medical reports).
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specific physician shortages.68 In 2004, for example, Merritt,
Hawkins & Associates published a detailed monograph predicting
a looming shortage of 90,000 to 200,000 physicians across the
United States, a dramatic increase in average wait times for nonemergency physician appointments, and increased health care
costs.69
Similarly, COGME in 2005 released a report projecting a
shortage of approximately 85,000 to 96,000 physicians across the
United States by 2020.70 COGME identified three major factors
driving its projected physician shortage, including population
growth, population aging, and the changing age-specific per
capita physician utilization rates, including the higher use of
services by individuals over age 45.71 To meet excess demand for
physician services, COGME recommended an increase by 3,000 in
the number of physicians entering residency training.72 COGME
also recommended that the distribution of generalist and
specialist physicians not reflect a rigid numerical target but,
instead, ongoing assessments of demand for particular health
care services.73
Likewise, the Center for Workforce Studies of the Association
of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) issued in 2008 a report
projecting a physician shortage of 124,000 physicians by 2025 if

68. See, e.g., ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., CTR. FOR WORKFORCE STUDIES,
RECENT STUDIES AND REPORTS ON PHYSICIAN SHORTAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 1–
22 (2012) [hereinafter AAMC, RECENT STUDIES] (listing dozens of state and
specialty-specific reports published since 2000 that project significant physician
shortages by the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century); Iglehart,
Uncertain Future, supra note 50, at 1341 (referencing these reports). But see
Scott Gottlieb & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Op-Ed., No, There Won’t Be a Doctor
Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013, at A35 (expressing skepticism regarding
recent physician shortage projections).
69. JAMES MERRITT, JOSEPH HAWKINS & PHILLIP B. MILLER, WILL THE LAST
PHYSICIAN IN AMERICA PLEASE TURN OFF THE LIGHTS? A LOOK AT AMERICA’S
LOOMING DOCTOR SHORTAGE (2d ed. 2004).
70. COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., SIXTEENTH REPORT: PHYSICIAN
WORKFORCE POLICY GUIDELINES FOR THE UNITED STATES, 2000 TO 2020, at xvi
(2005).
71. Id. at xv.
72. Id. at xvii.
73. Id.
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physician supply and use stayed the same.74 Given likely changes
in physician supply and use, the AAMC issued a second
projection that is a shortage of 159,300 physicians by 2025.75 The
AAMC noted that even a robust expansion of GME capacity
(from, for example, 25,000 to 32,000 new medical residents per
year) would only reduce its shortage projections by 54,000.76
In addition, a team of physicians affiliated with leading
medical centers and health policy institutes across the United
States prepared in 2009 a report on behalf of The Physicians
Foundation for distribution to the federal government.77 Based on
their assessment of the future demand for physician services, the
team endorsed the above-discussed reports projecting physician
shortages.78 The team ultimately recommended that Congress
provide financial support for the expansion of UME schools and
that Congress remove the caps it placed in 1997 on the number of
Medicare-financed GME positions.79
By final example, the National Center for Health Workforce
Analysis within the federal Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA) issued a report in late 2013 projecting
that the demand for primary care physicians will grow more
rapidly than the supply of primary care physicians through
2020.80 In particular, HRSA projected that the total number of
74. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., CTR. FOR WORKFORCE STUDIES, THE
COMPLEXITIES OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND: PROJECTIONS THROUGH 2025,
at 5–6 (2008).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 7.
77. RICHARD A. COOPER ET AL., THE PHYSICIANS FOUNDATION, PHYSICIANS
AND THEIR PRACTICES UNDER HEALTH CARE REFORM: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE CONGRESS 1–48 (Sep. 9, 2009).
78. See id. at 5, 20 (“Based on an assessment of the future demand for
physician services, the Project Team endorsed recent reports showing that
physician shortages are developing across all specialties and region.”).
79. See id. at 5 (“[T]he Team urged Congress to remove the cap on
Medicare’s support of residency positions, which was established more than a
decade ago. The Team also called on academic leaders and health insurers to
find an equitable payment formula for GME that encompasses all payers.”).
80. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE ANALYSIS, PROJECTING THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF PRIMARY CARE PRACTITIONERS THROUGH 2020, at 1–2 (2013)
[hereinafter HRSA PROJECTIONS 2013].
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primary care physicians will increase by eight percent (from
205,000 FTEs in 2010 to 220,800 FTEs in 2020), but that the
total demand for primary care physicians will increase by
fourteen percent (from 212,500 FTEs in 2010 to 241,200 FTEs in
2020).81 These projections were based on the increase in the
demand growth for primary care services due to overall
population growth, the aging population, and the expansion of
health insurance coverage required by the Affordable Care Act.82
HRSA concluded that, without changes to the primary care
delivery system, the growth in primary care physician supply
would be inadequate to meet demand in 2020 with a projected
shortage of 20,400 physicians nationwide.83
III. Regional and State Physician Workforce Data
Part II reviewed a number of reports assessing the overall
size and shape of the physician workforce in the United States
and showed that the current consensus is that the United States
will experience significant shortages of both generalist and
specialist physicians by the end of the first quarter of the twentyfirst century.84 This Part examines regional and state physician
workforce data and explores other factors that are necessary to
consider when making determinations regarding optimal and
equitable physician supply and distribution in particular
geographic areas.
As might be expected, some geographic areas within the
United States have significantly higher numbers of physicians
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., HRSA PROJECTIONS 2006, supra note 52, at 3 (“[A] growing
consensus is that over the next 15 years, requirements for physician services
will grow faster than supply—especially for specialist services and specialties
that predominantly serve the elderly.”); Berényi, Preface, supra note 49, at xiii
(same); AM. MED. ASS’N, CTR. FOR TRANSFORMING MED. EDUC. & ADVOCACY RES.
CTR, CRITICAL CONDITION: THE CALL TO INCREASE GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION
FUNDING 1 (2011) (“Many authorities agree that by 2025 the United States will
face a shortage of physicians to meet the needs of a growing and aging U.S.
population.”).
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than other areas. The Middle Atlantic, which includes New
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, has 168,230 total
physicians, 126,890 of whom are in patient care.85 In comparison,
the Mountain region, which includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, has only
61,098 total physicians, 46,377 of whom are in patient care.86
Similarly, the East South Central region, which includes
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee, has only 49,962
total physicians, 39,955 of whom are in patient care.87
Given the high populations in New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania, one would expect higher total numbers of
physicians there. More helpful, then, are statistics that show the
ratio of the number of physicians to a particular population. New
England (which includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) and the Middle
Atlantic have the highest numbers of total physicians in patient
care per 100,000 civilian population at 477 and 408,
respectively.88 The West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas), East South Central, and Mountain
regions have the lowest number of physicians per 100,000 civilian
population at 251, 268, and 270, respectively.89
Moving from regional to state data, the District of Columbia
has the highest physician-to-population ratio in the nation with
923 physicians per 100,000 population. 90 Six hundred fortyseven of these D.C. physicians are in patient care.91
Massachusetts has the second highest number of physicians per
100,000 population at 550,92 Maryland has the third highest
number at 484,93 and New York has the fourth highest number at
460.94 These numbers are not surprising given the high numbers
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

AMA, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 7, at 65, 90.
Id. at 65, 96.
Id. at 65, 94.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of UME schools and GME programs in New England and the
Middle Atlantic.95 Virtually all of New York City’s hospitals, for
example, are teaching hospitals.96 Six medical schools are located
in New York City’s 301 square miles alone and a seventh medical
school, which relocated to a suburban county to the north, still
maintains a large number of teaching hospitals in the city.97 In
addition, nine of the eleven public acute-care hospitals in New
York City are affiliated with teaching programs.98
Physician-to-population ratios generally drop as one moves in
a westerly and southerly direction. Idaho, for example, has the
lowest number of physicians per 100,000 population at 204.99
Oklahoma has the second lowest number at 208,100 Mississippi
has the third lowest number at 212,101 and Wyoming and Nevada
tied for the fourth lowest number at 223.102 Other states that are
in the top ten in terms of the lowest number of physicians per
100,000 population include Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Indiana, Iowa, Texas, and Utah.103 Primary care physician-topopulation ratios also drop as one moves in a westerly and
southerly direction.104 Vermont, Maine, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire have the highest ratios of primary care physicians to
population in the nation.105 Mississippi, Utah, Nevada, and Texas

95. See AM. ASS’N OF MED. COLLS., NUMBER OF U.S. MEDICAL SCHOOLS BY
REGION 1 (2011) (showing that there are forty-five medical schools in the
“Northeastern” region and forty-seven in the “Southern” region, including
several Middle-Atlantic states like Virginia and Pennsylvania, but only thirtythree in the “Central” region and twenty in the “Western” region).
96. Howard S. Berliner, Changes in the Health Care Delivery System in
New York City: 1980–90, in CHANGING U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra note 49, at 17.
97. Id. at 17–18.
98. Id. at 18.
99. See AMA, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 7, at 458 (presenting
physician to population ratios and state rank for 2012).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See AAMC, 2013 PHYSICIAN DATA BOOK, supra note 7, at 13–14
(presenting primary care physicians to population ratios for 2012).
105. Id.
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have the lowest ratios of primary care physicians to population in
the nation.106
The data presented above allow for simple comparisons
between total and relative numbers of physicians in different
regions and states.107 Standing alone, however, this data cannot
be interpreted as an oversupply or undersupply of physicians or
an appropriate distribution or maldistribution of physicians.108 A
number of other factors must be considered in assessing optimal
and equitable physician supply and distribution.109 Some of these
factors are discussed below.
Local health care needs are an important factor in any
physician workforce analysis.110 For example, age-adjusted rates
of lung cancer in Jacksonville, Florida, have been among the
highest of any metropolitan area in the United States for
decades.111 With an estimated population of around 842,000,112
Jacksonville may need a greater supply of physicians who treat
and diagnose lung cancer than a similarly sized city with lower
rates of lung cancer. Likewise, Houston, Texas, is home to several
major industries, including the oil and gas, petrochemical,
shipping, manufacturing, and agricultural industries.113 Although
106. Id.
107. See AMA, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 7, at 64 (stating that
the population and physician ratios “are presented as general guidelines to
compare the distributions of physicians”).
108. Id. at 439; see also RAYMOND W. PONG & J. ROGER PITBLADO,
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS IN CANADA: BEYOND HOW MANY AND
WHERE vii (2005) (explaining that a maldistribution of health care providers
occurs when there is a “mismatch between the spatial distribution of
inhabitants and that of health care providers”).
109. See AMA, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 7, at 64 (“It is
recognized that the quality and quantity of health care are predicated on a
variety of factors such as medical need for services, demographic composition,
geographical location, and socioeconomic variables, among others.”).
110. See id. (including “medical need for services” as a factor affecting the
analysis of health care provider distribution).
111. Phyllis M. Tousey et al., Determinants of the Excessive Rates of Lung
Cancer in Northeast Florida, 92(5) S. MED. J. 493, 493 (1999).
112. State and County Quick Facts, Jacksonville (City) Florida, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/1235000.html (last updated July 8,
2014) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
113. Loe et al., supra note 49, at 159–60.
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the diversity of industry assures Houston a strong economic base,
one result is a relatively high number of environmental and
occupational health hazards and related illnesses and injuries.114
With an estimated population of 2.2 million,115 Houston may need
a greater supply of physicians who are specifically trained to
treat environmental and occupational illness and injuries than a
similarly sized, but less industrial, city. Stated another way, total
population is certainly not the only factor that should be
considered in determining the number and specialty of physicians
needed in a particular geographic area.116
Putting aside local differences in health care needs and
holding steady other factors, demand for certain health care
services can still increase over time, thus necessitating a greater
supply of physicians who specialize in the provision of those
services.117 In 1980, for example, 400,000 patients were
hospitalized for heart failure.118 By 2000, this number rose to
almost one million.119 Holding steady other factors, this data may
suggest a need for an increased supply of cardiologists. Similarly,
the prevalence of autism has increased twentyfold to thirtyfold
since the earliest epidemiologic studies were conducted in the late
1960s and early 1970s.120 During that time period, prevalence
estimates were approximately one in 2,500 children.121 Today,
prevalence estimates are one to two percent of all children.122
Holding steady other factors, this data may suggest a need for an
114.
115.

Id. at 161.
State and County Quick Facts, Houston (City) Texas, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/4835000.html (last updated July 8,
2014) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
116. See AMA, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 7, at 64 (listing
factors in addition to population that should be considered in a physician supply
analysis).
117. THE COMING SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at 3.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorder Among Children
Aged 8 Years—Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring Network,
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Mar. 28, 2014, at 2.
121. Id.
122. Id.

I NEED A DOCTOR

2451

increased supply of physicians and other allied health
professionals who are trained in providing services to children
with autism.123
The age of the population in a particular geographic area is
another important consideration in any assessment of physician
supply.124 According to the U. S. Census Bureau (Census Bureau),
the median age of U. S. residents grew from 35.3 years in 2000 to
37.2 years in 2010.125 In addition, an estimated 22% of the U. S.
population will be over the age of 65 by 2030, and the fastest
growing cohort within this subgroup includes individuals over
75.126 Currently, approximately 44.5 million people are over the
age of 75; by 2050, individuals over age 75 will number almost 50
million.127 Older individuals typically utilize more, and higher
cost, health care services than younger individuals.128 Thus, the
average age of the population in a given geographic area as well
as the total and relative number of residents in the population’s
upper age brackets are important factors in assessing optimal
physician and specialty supply for that area.129 Florida, for
example, has a higher percentage of residents who are 65 or older
123. See id. at 10 (noting that an analysis of service delivery patterns
gleaned from sources that report prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorder
“might affect policy and funding decisions surrounding the early identification
and treatment of [Autism Spectrum Disorder]”).
124. See AMA, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 7, at 64 (including
“demographic composition” and “geographic location” as factors affecting the
quality of health care and an analysis of physician supply).
125. Lindsay M. Howden & Julie A. Meyer, Age and Sex Composition: 2010,
2010 CENSUS BRIEFS, May 2011, at 5.
126. Sara J. Czaja & Joseph Sharit, The Aging of the Population:
Opportunities and Challenges for Human Factors Engineering, 39 BRIDGE 34, 34
(2009).
127. Id.
128. See Mark W. Stanton, The High Concentration of U.S. Health Care
Expenditures, 19 RES. IN ACTION, June 2006, at 3 (“The elderly (age 65 and over)
made up around 13% of the U.S. population in 2002, but they consumed 36% of
total U.S. personal health care expenses.”).
129. See, e.g., Nat’l Center for Health Workforce Analysis, Professions
Projecting the Supply and Demand for Primary Care Practitioners Through
2020, Nov. 2013, at 22–23 (noting the increasing median age and stating that,
“[s]ince the amount of primary care services sought by patients varies
substantially by age, these demographics suggest a growing demand for
geriatrics”).
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(18.2%) compared to the national average (13.7%).130 Dixie
County, Florida, has a particularly high percentage of residents
(20.7%) who are 65 or older.131 Physician requirements (and the
average cost of health care) in Dixie County, Florida, will be very
different than, say, Utah County, Utah, which has a very high
birth rate and where only 6.8% of individuals are 65 or older.132
Any assessment of physician supply in a particular
geographic area also must consider cultural determinants of
health care access and effectiveness.133 In 2010, for example, 41%
of Hispanics lived in the West and 36% lived in the South.134 The
Northeast and Midwest only accounted for 14% and 9%,
respectively, of the United States Hispanic population.135
Although the Hispanic population grew in every region between
2000 and 2010, more rapid growth occurred in the South and
Midwest.136 Overall, 12.9% of individuals living in the United
States are Hispanic; however, certain states such as New Mexico
(42.1%), California (32.4%), and Texas (32.0%), have significantly
higher percentages of Hispanic residents.137 The cultural
determinants of health care access and effectiveness would be

130. State and County Quick Facts, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last
updated July 8, 2014), quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12000.html (last visited
Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
131. State and County Quick Facts, Dixie County, Florida, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (last updated July 8, 2014), quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
12/12029.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
132. State and County Quick Facts, Utah County, Utah, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/49/49049.html (last updated July 8,
2014) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
133. See, e.g., Leo S. Morales et al., Socioeconomic, Cultural, and Behavioral
Factors Affecting Hispanic Health Outcomes, 13(4) J. HEALTH CARE POOR &
UNDERSERVED 477, 477 (2002) (examining cultural factors affecting health care
access and outcomes).
134. Sharon R. Ennis et al., The Hispanic Population: 2010, 2010 CENSUS
BRIEFS, May 2011, at 4.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 6 tbl.2.
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important considerations in assessing physician workforces in
these regions and states.138
Rates of health insurance among patients and willingness of
physicians to accept health insurance also must be considered in
any assessment of physician supply (and patient access to that
supply).139 Even in an area with a high number of physicians, an
individual who does not have health insurance and who cannot
pay for health care out of his or her own pocket likely will not be
able to access an otherwise available physician.140 Although the
Affordable Care Act (ACA)141 does require all individuals to
obtain and maintain minimum essential health insurance
coverage142 and makes it easier for certain individuals to qualify
for Medicaid due to ACA’s Medicaid expansion,143 ACA will not
solve the nation’s health care access problems for several reasons.
First, a growing number of physicians across the United States
do not accept any type of health insurance, regardless of whether
it is private or public insurance.144 Second, even those physicians
who accept private insurance may not accept Medicare or

138. See, e.g., José J. Escarce & Kanika Kapur, Access to and Quality of
Health Care, in HISPANICS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 410, 410–46 (Marta
Tienda & Faith Mitchell eds., 2006) (examining features of the Hispanic
population that affect access to and quality of health care).
139. See id. at 411 (“Lacking health insurance makes the costs of health care
services prohibitive for many people and is the most important barrier to
adequate health care access.”).
140. GINZBERG & MINOGIANNIS, supra note 53, at 13.
141. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (“PPACA”), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (“HCERA”) [as
consolidated, the Affordable Care Act; hereinafter ACA] § 1501(b).
142. 26 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012).
143. Id. § 2001(a).
144. See, e.g., Barbara Hollingsworth, More Physicians Are Refusing to
Accept Any Third Party Insurance, CNSNEWS.COM (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/barbara-hollingsworth/more-physicians-arerefusing-to-accept-any-third-party-insurance (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
(quoting the Executive Director of the American Association of Physicians and
Surgeons as stating that “[a] small but growing number of physicians are not
accepting government insurance, such as Medicare and Medicaid, and are even
refusing to accept patients’ private insurance”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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Medicaid.145 Indeed, a recent study found that although 83.0%
and 69.4% of doctors nationwide accept new Medicare and
Medicaid patients, respectively, the rates vary widely across the
nation.146 For example, Wyoming, Minnesota, and North Dakota
had the three highest rates of physician acceptance of new
Medicaid patients at 99.3%, 96.3%, and 94.6%, respectively.147
New Jersey, California, and Florida had the three lowest rates of
physician acceptance of new Medicaid patients at 40.4%, 57.1%,
and 59.1%, respectively.148 One way some workforce analysts
measure the availability of the physician workforce is by
measuring physicians’ willingness to accept new patients.149
Although New Jersey is ranked in the top ten in the nation in
terms of states with the largest numbers of physicians,150 these
physicians actually may be less accessible to New Jersey
Medicaid beneficiaries compared to the accessibility of Wyoming
physicians to Wyoming Medicaid beneficiaries.151 Stated slightly
differently, states such as New Jersey may actually need to
increase their supply of physicians who accept Medicaid.152
Medical specialty is another factor that needs to be
considered in assessments of the relationship between physician
supply and patient insurance status.153 Recent studies show that
some physician specialties are more likely to accept Medicare and

145. See Sandra L. Decker, In 2011 Nearly One-Third of Physicians Said
They Would Not Accept New Medicaid Patients, But Rising Fees May Help, 31
HEALTH AFF. 1673, 1675 (2012) (noting that 69.4% of physicians nationally
accepted new patients with Medicaid compared to 81.7% that accepted patients
with private insurance).
146. Id. at 1676 ex. 2.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1673.
150. AMA, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 7, at 286 tbl.H.
151. See Decker, supra note 145, at 1676 ex. 2 (showing that 97.9% of
Wyoming physicians accepted new Medicaid patients compared to 27.9% of New
Jersey physicians in 2011).
152. See id. (stating physician statistics regarding Medicaid acceptance).
153. See Esther Hing & Susan Schappert, Generalist and Specialty
Physicians: Supply and Access, 2009–2010, NCHS DATA BRIEF, Sept. 2012, at 3
(listing factors to consider in a physician supply analysis).
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Medicaid patients than are other physician specialties.154 Data
from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS)
show that, in 2009 and 2010, generalist physicians were less
likely to accept new Medicaid patients (65%) than were specialist
physicians (71%).155 Again, this data could be relevant in
workforce projections that are focused on increasing the supply of
physicians for the Medicaid population.156
Other physician characteristics also affect assessments of
physician supply and distribution. The age of physicians in
patient care as well as their average retirement also must be
considered.157 If two geographic areas have the same population
and the same number of physicians but the average physician age
in the first geographic area is 38 and the average physician age in
the second geographic area is 50, then the second area may
become undersupplied more quickly than the first area. Indeed,
states have very uneven numbers and percentages of older
physicians.158 For example, 17,373 of Florida’s 60,644 physicians
(28.6%) are 65 or older.159 In comparison, only 3,539 of
Wisconsin’s 17,787 physicians (19.9%) are 65 or older.160 Holding
all other factors equal, Florida may become relatively
undersupplied more quickly due to a larger percentage of older
physicians.161

154. See, e.g., id. (noting that 71% of specialty physicians accepted new
Medicaid patients in 2009–2010 compared to 65% of generalist physicians that
accepted new Medicaid patients).
155. Id. This study defined generalists as physicians in the “specialties of
family practice, general medicine, internal medicine, and pediatrics. Specialists
included physicians in all other specialties.” Id. at 1.
156. See Nat’l Center for Health Workforce Analysis, supra note 129, at 1,
25 (noting the interplay between Medicaid expansion and models predicting
physician supply).
157. See THE COMING SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at 5 (noting that “changing
retirement ages adds to the problem” of a potential future physician shortage).
158. See AMA, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 7, at 51 tbl.2.1.
(listing the average age of physicians in each state).
159. Id. at 51.
160. Id.
161. See id. (showing that Florida has more physicians that are more than
sixty-four years old than any other state).
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Workforce assessments also must consider average
retirement ages, which are lowering over time.162 The average
retirement age of a general surgeon used to be 71 years of age.163
By 2000, it had dropped to 58.164 A recent survey reported that
among physicians who are 50 years old, almost 50% of them were
planning to retire, limit their practices, or seek other nonclinical
opportunities within the next three years.165 Even in geographic
areas that have had an adequate supply of physicians in the past,
lowering retirement ages may suggest a need for a greater
physician supply in the future.166
Other physician work characteristics also affect assessments
of physician supply and distribution. For example, some
physician specialties are more likely to see patients during the
evening and on the weekends than other physician specialties.167
NAMCS data from 2009 to 2010 show that a greater percentage
of generalist physicians worked evening and weekend hours
(40%) than did specialty physicians (19%).168 This data could be
very relevant in geographic areas where a high percentage of
residents work particular shifts, such as in factory towns. That is,
holding all other factors equal, efforts to increase the number of
generalist physicians, who may be more willing to work evening
and weekend hours, may result in a higher effective supply of
physicians than efforts to increase the number of specialist
physicians, who would be less accessible to area residents with
day-only shifts.
Physician workforce assessments also must consider the
number of patient visits physicians are willing to schedule each
year.169 NAMCS data from 2009 to 2010 show that although the
162. See THE COMING SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at 5 (noting that “changing
retirement ages adds to the problem” of a potential future physician shortage).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
167. See Hing & Schappert, supra note 153, at 4 (stating that generalist
physicians worked more evening and weekend hours than did specialty
physicians in 2009 to 2010).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 5 (discussing the difference in scheduling practices between
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number of specialty physicians (636 per one million population)
was significantly larger than the number of generalist physicians
(472 per one million population), the number of visits to both
types of physicians was about the same, resulting in higher
annual visits per generalist than per specialist.170 As in the prior
example, this data could be relevant in discussions regarding the
supply and distribution of generalists versus specialists.171
Ancillary medical resources also are important in physician
workforce analyses.172 Most states allow nurse practitioners,
physician assistants, and certain other non-physician
practitioners to independently provide a number of health care
services—including the taking of personal and medical histories,
the performance of physical examinations, the ordering of some
tests, the administration of some vaccines, and the prescription of
some drugs (such as oral contraceptives and topical anti-parasitic
drugs)—or to provide these services pursuant to standing
delegation orders developed and approved by a physician.173 In
geographic areas with high numbers of non-physician
practitioners with broad scopes of practice, the supply of
physicians may not need to be as great.174
A final illustrative factor is projected population growth. The
population of the United States has increased from 227 million in
1980 to over 318 million in 2014, an increase of over 91 million
people.175 The Census Bureau predicts that the population of the
generalist and specialist physicians).
170. Id. at 2.
171. See id. at 6 (comparing physician workloads and suggesting further
research to monitor the supply of generalist physicians at state and local levels).
172. See, e.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 54, at 53–63 (noting that other health
care practitioners, including nurse practitioners and physician assistants, must
be considered in any physician workforce analysis).
173. See, e.g., 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 193.2(19), 193.4(1)–(8) (2014)
(defining standing delegation order and identifying health care services that
certain non-physician practitioners in Texas can provide pursuant to standing
delegation orders).
174. See HRSA PROJECTIONS 2013, supra note 80, at 2 (“Increased use of
[nurse practitioners and physician assistants] could somewhat alleviate the
projected primary care physician shortage if they are effectively integrated into
the health care delivery system.”).
175. THE COMING SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at 4 (providing 1980 data); U.S.
and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
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United States will reach 420 million by 2050, a 32% increase from
2014.176 The Census Bureau also has reported that population
growth is highest in the South and the West, especially in states
such as Arizona, Idaho, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.177 These and
other trends lead some workforce analysts to predict not only a
nationwide shortage of 500,000 physicians by the year 2050, but
also more severe physician shortages in some geographic areas
compared to others.178
These are illustrative, not exhaustive, examples of factors
that need to be considered in any assessment of physician supply
and distribution. Other factors include, but are not limited to,
advances in pharmacology and technology, which may render
obsolete some of the medical practices and procedures that are
required today, average patient care hours, which may be
declining as today’s physicians seek better work-life balance,
further health care reforms, including additional changes in
reimbursement and health care delivery models, and public
perceptions and expectations regarding appropriate use of health
care services and the ability of health care to improve health.179
IV. The Relationship Between Graduate Medical Education and
Physician Supply and Distribution
There is a widely held belief that expanding existing UME
schools or building new UME schools can cure physician
shortages.180 Expanding existing UME schools and building new
popclock/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (estimating the U.S. population on
September 8, 2014 at 1:46 PM EST to be 318,837,895) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
176. THE COMING SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at 4.
177. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for
physician shortages in the American South and West, where physician-topopulation ratios are generally less than other areas of the country).
178. THE COMING SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at 4.
179. See GINZBERG & MINOGIANNIS, supra note 53, at 13 (noting that
physician supply and access to health care is a multifaceted issue requiring
analysis of several factors); Thomas R. Russell, Foreword, in THE COMING
SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at xviii (listing several factors that affect physician
workforce analyses); SCHEFFLER, supra note 54, at 7 (same).
180. See JULIE C. SPERO ET AL., GME IN THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF
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UME schools is critically important for the United States’ longterm physician supply and is necessary to increase the number of
individuals who are prepared to begin their GME.181 In addition,
however, policymakers and the public also need to understand
the importance of GME to fulfill state licensure and practice
requirements.182 As discussed in more detail below, states with
physician shortages need the ability not only to expand existing
UME schools or build new UME schools, but also the ability to
expand existing GME programs or build new GME programs that
can absorb these recent undergraduates.183 This way, each state
can increase the number of fully-trained, practice-ready
physicians who are most likely to stay and practice medicine in
that state.184 Before proceeding to this point, some background
information regarding American medical education is necessary.
American medical education currently consists of three parts,
including a baccalaureate or advanced degree program providing
for the study of the basic medical sciences (sometimes referred to
as a “pre-medical education”), an allopathic or osteopathic UME
that leads to the M.D. or D.O. degree, and direct clinical
experience in one to eight years of GME.185 GME thus may be
defined as the process by which a physician acquires additional
clinical training in a designated area of specialization under the

STATE INITIATIVES 7 (2013) (stating that policymakers and interviewees from the
public at large “were more interested in financing a new medical school because
it increases a university’s or city’s prestige, . . . creates jobs, and tends to be
perceived positively by local constituents”).
181. See id. at 7–8 (noting evidence suggesting that the national growth of
UME positions has outpaced the growth of GME positions).
182. See id. at 7 (discussing GME positions).
183. See, e.g., NEV. LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON HEALTH CARE, NEVADA STRATEGIC
HEALTH PLAN, at 3 (2007) (recommending the expansion of GME in Nevada, in
part by seeking legislative removal of current resident caps).
184. See infra notes 185–221 and accompanying text (outlining the
American medical education system and presenting statistics on states’
retention of graduating physicians); supra note 13 and accompanying text
(noting that physicians who complete both their undergraduate and graduate
medical education in Nevada are most likely to stay and practice medicine in
Nevada).
185. See, e.g., HHS PRIMER, supra note 49, at 1 (providing an overview of
undergraduate and graduate medical education).
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supervision of a teaching physician.186 The first year of a
physician’s GME is frequently referred to as an internship. The
internship is followed by a core period of residency training.187
Core residency training may be followed by a fellowship or
additional advanced training that leads to a subspecialization,
such as one in pediatric oncology or forensic psychiatry.188
Residencies vary in length according to the chosen specialty and
typically require three to eight years to complete.189
Importantly, most states require a minimum of at least one
year of GME before licensure and practice, and most physicians
do complete a full course—three to eight years—of GME before
opening their own practices.190 In all specialties recognized by the
American Board of Medical Specialties and the American
Osteopathic Association, board certification requires completion
of a residency.191 Because only board-certified or board-eligible
physicians can obtain privileges in most hospitals, employment in
most hospital-owned groups, and service as a preferred provider
in most insurance panels, completion of a full course of GME is a
practical necessity for those physicians who would like to engage
in the traditional practice of medicine with hospital privileges
and third-party reimbursement.192 Only a few types of physicians
do not need to complete a full course of GME.193 Examples include
186. See id. at 2 (providing an overview of medical residency training).
187. Id.
188. See id. (discussing that medical students complete residencies that
further their training in a chosen specialty area).
189. Id.
190. See id. at 1 (noting most states permit the practice of medicine after one
year of “post-graduate training,” but most physicians complete several years of
graduate training first); Carolyn Schierhorn, Practicing After One Year of GME:
Is it Feasible? Should it Be? THE DO (Feb. 5, 2014, 5:13 PM),
http://thedo.osteopathic.org/2014/02/practicing-after-one-year-of-gme-is-itfeasible-should-it-be/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (discussing whether a
physician can realistically obtain employment after one year of training when
the majority of employment positions require certification) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
191. Schierhorn, supra note 190.
192. See id. (discussing the practical necessity for physicians to complete a
full GME program).
193. See id. (noting some physicians enter the workforce after one year of
training and discussing the types of employment).
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physicians who only want to work in the United States Military,
“which allows one-year-trained physicians to serve as general
medical officers and flight surgeons”; physicians who do not mind
having cash-only (i.e., non-third party reimbursed) medical
practices; and residents who moonlight to make extra money
during their residencies.194
GME typically occurs in teaching hospitals or other health
care settings that can provide a clinical setting that is
appropriate for the training of physicians.195 Most teaching
hospitals are tertiary care hospitals that treat high numbers of
medically complex patients and that care for a disproportionate
share of uninsured or underinsured patients.196 Financial
arrangements between teaching hospitals, where residents
physically see patients, and the medical schools that are
responsible for their training vary widely.197 As discussed infra
Part V.A.1, the “lack of consistency among these arrangements
makes it [extremely] difficult to accurately and appropriately
determine [and] allocate the costs of GME.”198
Nationally, the number of residents in ACGME-accredited
training programs per 100,000 population varies widely across
the United States, from a low of 2.0 in Montana to a high of 83.7
in Massachusetts.199 The national average is 36.6 residents per
100,000 population.200 In addition to Massachusetts, the four
states with the highest resident-to-population ratios include New
York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania.201 In
addition to Montana (ranked 50th), the ten states with the lowest
resident-to-population ratios include Georgia (ranked 40th),
Indiana (ranked 41st), Florida (ranked 42nd), Mississippi (ranked
194. Id.
195. HHS PRIMER, supra note 49, at 1–2.
196. Id. at 2.
197. See id. at 6 (noting the financial arrangements differ between programs
due to “location, custom[,] and mission”).
198. Id.
199. AAMC, 2013 PHYSICIAN DATA BOOK, supra note 7, at 32 map 6, 36
fig.12, 37 tbl.12.
200. Id. at 32.
201. See id. (displaying a graph and table with each state’s resident-topopulation ration compared to the other states).
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43rd), North Dakota (ranked 44th), South Dakota (ranked 45th),
Nevada (ranked 46th), Wyoming (ranked 47th), Idaho (ranked
48th), and Alaska (ranked 49th).202
State ratios showing the number of residents in GME
programs to the number of students in UME schools are also
helpful for understanding the relative number of residency
positions in a state. Nationally, the number of first year
allopathic and osteopathic UME seats increased by 30% between
2002 and 2012, from 19,567 to 25,503.203 During the same time
period, the number of first year (PGY-1) GME positions only
increased by 17%, from 20,602 to 24,034.204 Nationally, there are
still more residents in GME programs than there are students in
UME schools.205 In the United States during the 2011–2012
academic year, for example, the average ratio of GME residents
to UME students was 1.21 and the median ratio was 1.05.206
However, these ratios vary widely across the country, with some
states having significantly fewer GME slots than UME seats.207
The states with the highest GME-to-UME ratios include
Connecticut (2.44), Utah (2.05), Rhode Island (1.89), Minnesota
(1.86), Massachusetts (1.83), and New York (1.72).208 The states
with the lowest GME-to-UME ratios—not including Alaska,
Delaware, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, which do not have
either an allopathic or an osteopathic UME school and for which
a GME-to-UME ratio can be calculated—include Iowa (0.56),
West Virginia (0.55), South Dakota (0.51), North Dakota (0.46),
and Nevada (ranked last in the nation with a ratio of 0.45).209

202. Id.
203. SPERO ET AL., GME, supra note 180, at 7.
204. See id. at 7–8 (noting the difference in growth rates between UME
seats and GME positions).
205. See AAMC, 2013 PHYSICIAN DATA BOOK, supra note 7, at 42 fig.15
(noting the United States has more residents than medical students in the
2011–2012 academic year).
206. Id. at 42 fig.15, 43 tbl.15.
207. See id. (providing a graph and table of each state’s GME-to-UME ratio
and actual number of GME residents and UME students).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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Nationwide, almost one-half (47.4%) of physicians will stay
and practice medicine in the state where they completed their
most recent GME.210 In some states, more than one-half of
physicians will stay and practice medicine in the state if they
completed their most recent GME there.211 The states with the
highest GME retention rates are in the South and the West.212
Nevada, for example, had the ninth highest GME retention rate
in the nation; that is, after completing their GME in Nevada,
55.8% of these physicians stayed in or returned to Nevada to
practice medicine.213 GME retention rates are significantly higher
than UME retention rates.214 Nationwide, only 38.7% of
allopathic and osteopathic medical students practice in the same
state where they completed their UME.215 Due in part to the low
number of residency slots, Nevada, for example, retained only
36.8% of the physicians who completed their UME in the state.216
State retention rates are the highest for physicians who
complete both their UME and GME in that state.217 In 2012, twothirds (66.6%) of the physicians in the United States who
completed their UME and GME in the same state remained in or
returned to that state to practice medicine.218 Most of the top
states in terms of combined UME and GME retention rates were
in the South and West.219 In 2012, for example, only 211 actively
practicing physicians had completed both their UME and GME in
210. AAMC, 2013 PHYSICIAN DATA BOOK, supra note 7, at 47.
211. See id. at 52 fig.19, 53 tbl.19 (providing bar graph and table displaying
data showing each state’s physician retention rate from GME in 2012).
212. See id. at 47 map 11, 52 fig.19, 53 tbl.19 (identifying California, Florida,
Texas, Arkansas, and Nevada as having high GME retention rates).
213. See id. at 52 fig.19, 53 tbl.19 (providing bar graph and table displaying
data showing each state’s physician retention rate from GME in 2012).
214. See id. at 48 fig.17, 49 tbl.17, 52 fig.19, 53 tbl.19 (comparing GME
retention rates with UME retention rates).
215. Id. at 46 map 10, 48 fig.17, 49 tbl.17.
216. Id. at 49 tbl.17.
217. See id. at 54 fig.20, 55 tbl.20 (displaying data on the retention rates of
physicians who complete their UME and GME in the same state).
218. Id. at 47 map 11.
219. See id. at 47 map 11, 54 fig.20, 55 tbl.20 (identifying Arkansas,
California, Texas, California, Nevada, Florida, and Mississippi as having high
retention rates for physicians who completed both UME and GME in the state).
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Nevada.220 However, Nevada retained 167 of these still actively
practicing physicians, resulting in a 79.1% retention rate, the
fifth highest in the country.221
In summary, states like Nevada that have low GME-to-UME
ratios are investing in the undergraduate medical educations of
individuals who then leave to complete their medical training and
open their practices elsewhere. However, given Nevada’s and
other similarly situated states’ very high UME-plus-GME
retention rates, the building of new or expansion of existing UME
schools combined with the building of new or expansion of
existing GME programs would increase the number of local
physicians but for the limitations on resident caps and build-out
periods that I describe in Part V and that I propose eliminating in
Part VI.
V. Medicare Financing of Graduate Medical Education
Given the importance of GME to physician supply and
distribution, Part V examines the history and regulation of
Medicare financing of GME. In 1965, Congress stated its intent
that a part of the net costs of GME, including resident stipends
and supervising faculty compensation, should be borne by the
newly created Medicare Program:222
220. Id. at 55 tbl.20.
221. Id.
222. Funded and administered by the federal government, Medicare is a
public healthcare program that in 1966 began providing health insurance to
individuals age sixty-five or older who were insured under the Federal Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance Program. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L.
No. 89-97, §§ 101–22, 79 Stat. 286, 290–360 (1965) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Social Security Amendments of 1972
expanded Medicare eligibility to include certain individuals under the age of
sixty-five who had disabilities and certain individuals with end-stage renal
disease. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 299I, 86
Stat. 1329, 1463–64 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); Robert M. Ball, Social Security Amendments of 1972: Summary and
Legislative History, SOCIAL SECURITY BULL., Mar. 1973, at 3, 18–19,
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/ docs/ssb/v36n3/v36n3p3.pdf (discussing the expansion
of Medicare eligibility). At the time of the Social Security Amendments of 1965
and 1972, Medicare coverage consisted only of hospital insurance, known as
Medicare Part A, as well as supplemental medical insurance, known as
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Many hospitals engage in substantial educational activities,
including the training of medical students, internship and
residency programs, the training of nurses, and the training of
various paramedical personnel. Educational activities enhance
the quality of care in an institution, and it is intended, until
the community undertakes to bear such education costs in
some other way, that a part of the net cost of such activities
(including stipends of trainees as well as compensation of
teachers and other costs) should be borne . . . to an appropriate
extent by the hospital insurance program.223

Indeed, when President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Social
Security Amendments of 1965 (Amendments) into law on July 30,
1965,224 the Amendments provided that GME costs were
allowable inpatient hospital service225 costs for which teaching
Medicare Part B. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to i-5 (2012) (codifying “[Medicare] Part
A—Hospital Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled”); id. §§ 1395j to w-5
(codifying “[Medicare] Part B—Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits for
Aged and Disabled”). In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress added a
third part to the Medicare Program, Medicare Part C. Balanced Budget Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395w-21 to w-28 (2012)). Named Medicare+Choice, this part provided
Medicare beneficiaries with managed care options. Id. In the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA),
Congress changed the compensation and business practices for insurers offering
Medicare+Choice plans, renaming the part Medicare Advantage (MA). Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, §§ 201–38, 117 Stat. 2066, 2176–2214 (2003) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The MMA also added a fourth part to the
Medicare Program, Medicare Part D, which provided a prescription drug benefit
that subsidized the costs of prescription drugs and prescription drug insurance
premiums for Medicare beneficiaries. Id. §§ 101–11 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395w-101 to w-154 (2012)).
223. SEN. REP. NO. 89-404, at 36.
224. Social Security Amendments of 1965, 79 Stat. at 286.
225. The Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Act), which created the
Medicare Program, stated that “[t]he benefits provided to an individual by the
insurance program under this part shall consist of entitlement to have payment
made on his behalf (subject to the provisions of this part) for inpatient hospital
services for up to 90 days during any spell of illness.” See Health Insurance for
the Aged Act, in SSA Amendments of 1965, supra note 222, §§ 101–102. The Act
further defined “inpatient hospital services” to include
services provided in the hospital by an intern or a resident-intraining under a teaching program approved by the Council on
Medical Education of the American Medical Association or, in the
case of an osteopathic hospital, approved by the Committee on
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hospitals may receive Medicare reimbursement on a reasonable
cost basis.226 As a result of the Amendments and their
implementing regulations, teaching hospitals seeking payments
from Medicare for GME costs between fiscal years 1967 and 1984
simply filed an annual cost report227 with an assigned fiscal
intermediary.228 The intermediary then made a discrete annual
Hospitals of the Bureau of Professional Education of the American
Osteopathic Association or, in the case of services in a hospital or
osteopathic hospital by an intern or resident-in-training in the field of
dentistry, approved by the Council on Dental Education of the
American Dental Association.
Id. (defining inpatient hospital services by adding Social Security Act § 1861(b)).
226. See Wilburn J. Cohen & Robert M. Ball, Social Security Amendments of
1965: Summary and Legislative History, SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 3, 10, 12 (Sept.
1965), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v28n9/v28n9p3.pdf (stating that
payment for inpatient hospital services includes services “provided by interns or
residents in training under approved teaching programs” and payment is made
on a reasonable cost basis). The “reasonable cost” standard comes from language
in the Health Insurance for the Aged Act of 1965 (Act) providing, “[t]he amount
paid to any provider of services with respect to services for which payment may
be made under this part shall . . . be the reasonable cost of such services . . . .”
See id. (adding Social Security Act § 1814(b)). The Act directed the Secretary of
the federal Department of Health, Education & Welfare to establish regulations
determining reasonable cost. See id. (adding Social Security Act § 1861(v)).
227. A Medicare cost report is a series of forms that collect descriptive,
financial, and statistical data from an institutional healthcare provider such as
a hospital, nursing facility, or home health agency to determine whether
Medicare overpaid or underpaid the provider. See, e.g., Cost Reports, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Dataand-Systems/Files-for-Order/CostReports/index.html?redirect=/costreports/ (last
updated July 23, 2014, 10:03 AM) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (explaining the
requirement for Medicare-certified institutional providers to submit annual cost
reports) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
228.
Since Medicare’s inception in 1966, private health insurers known as
Part A Fiscal Intermediaries (FIs) and Part B carriers served as the
federal government’s agents in the administration of the Medicare
program, including the processing of health care claims. Section 911
of the MMA mandated the Secretary of the Federal Department of
Health & Human Services (HHS) to replace Part A FIs and Part B
carriers with Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs). As
required under the MMA, [the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) within HHS] established MACs as multi-state,
regional contractors responsible for administering both Medicare Part
A and Medicare Part B claims. The transition from Part A FIs and
Part B carriers to MACs began in 2006, and the last FI and carrier
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determination of the reasonable GME costs actually incurred by
the teaching hospital and then paid that amount to the teaching
hospital.229 Neither the Amendments nor their implementing
regulations limited the number of residents whose training costs
could be reimbursed.230 Thus, teaching hospitals located in
geographic areas with low resident-to-population ratios and in
physician shortage areas were able to add residents to existing
training programs and start new training programs without
federal constraint.231
contracts [ended in] September 2013.
Medicare Administrative Contractors, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Contracting/Medicare-Admini
strative-Contractors/MedicareAdministrativeContractors.html (last updated
July 10, 2013, 2:33 PM) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (discussing the transition
from FIs and carriers to MACs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
229. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-09-00-00200, MEDICARE
HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: HOW DRG RATES ARE CALCULATED AND
UPDATED
(2001)
[hereinafter
OIG,
MEDICARE
HOSPITAL
PPS],
https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00200.pdf
From fiscal years 1967 to 1984, hospitals were paid on the basis of the
actual cost for providing services to Medicare beneficiaries. Under
this system, each hospital submitted a report called a “cost report,”
which itemized expenditures incurred in the hospital’s prior
accounting period or “fiscal year” . . . .
230. See, e.g., Federal Health Insurance for the Aged, 20 C.F.R. § 405.421(a)
(1968) (“An appropriate part of the net cost of approved educational activities is
an allowable cost.”); id. § 405.421(b)(2) (defining “net cost” to include “stipends
of trainees, compensation of teachers, and other costs[], less any
reimbursements from grants, tuition, and specific donations”); id. § 405.521(d)
If the teaching program is an approved educational activity of the
hospital, reimbursement will also be available on a cost basis to the
hospital for an appropriate share of the compensation it pays to
physicians for teaching services . . . and for other costs of educational
programs conducted by the hospital. These costs are allowable in
accordance with the principles of reimbursement for provider
costs . . . .
231. See Eugene C. Rich et al., Medicare Financing of Graduate Medical
Education: Intractable Problems, Elusive Solutions, 17 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
283, 284 (2002) [hereinafter Rich et al., Medicare Financing] (“Medicare placed
no limit on the number of residents reimbursed, so teaching hospitals were able
to start new training programs and add residents to existing programs without
federal constraint.”); Medicare Funding of Graduate Medical Education, AM.
MED. ASS’N, MEDICARE FUNDING OF GRADUATE MED. EDUC. (June 1999),
http://lobby.la.psu.edu/011_Grad_Med/Organizational_Statements/American_M
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The days of open-ended, cost-based, retrospective
reimbursement of GME did not last long, and government
financing of GME quickly became an intensely controversial
topic.232 In 1986, President Reagan signed into law the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA),
which amended certain provisions within section 1886 of the
Social Security Act (Act) relating to GME.233 COBRA’s new GME
provisions, implemented through regulations now codified at 42
C.F.R. §§ 413.75 through 413.83234 as well as 42 C.F.R.
edical_Association/AMA_Medicare_Funding_of_Graduate_Medical_Education.ht
m (last updated Sept. 16, 1999) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) [hereinafter AMA,
MEDICARE FUNDING] (“Before 1985, direct GME payments were un-capitated,
and could be increased if a hospital’s direct GME costs increased.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); HHS Primer, supra note 49, at 16
[Until 1997], Medicare imposed no limits on the number of residents
it supported—either at an individual hospital or in the national
aggregate—as long as the residents are enrolled in a training
program approved by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education or leading to a certificate by the American Board of
Medical Specialties.
In an extreme oversimplification of the reasonable cost-based system of
reimbursing teaching hospitals for GME, a teaching hospital that had a
Medicare beneficiary utilization of 35% of the hospital in a given year would
receive from Medicare a payment equal to 35% of the hospital’s total GME costs
for that year. See THE COMING SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at 114 (describing costbased reimbursement for GME); Thomas C. Gentile, Jr. & David R. Buckley,
Medicare Reimbursement and Graduate Medical Education, in MEDICAL
EDUCATION IN THE TEACHING HOSPITAL 14-2 [hereinafter Gentile & Buckley,
Medicare Reimbursement] (“Medicare paid its pro rata share . . . .”).
232. See THE COMING SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at 114 (“Prior to 1984,
Medicare simply paid expenses allocated to medical training programs under an
open ended, cost based, retrospective reimbursement system.”); Gentile &
Buckley, Medicare Reimbursement, supra note 231 at 14-1 (“[F]ederal financing
of GME is an intensely controversial subject.”).
233. Medicare & Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985, Pub.
L. No. 99-272, §§ 9104, 9202, 100 Stat. 82, 157-58, 171-77 (1986) (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x, 1395ww) (adding provisions titled “Payments to
Hospitals for Indirect Costs of Medical Education” and “Payments to Hospitals
for Direct Costs of Medical Education”).
234. 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.75–85 govern Medicare payments to teaching hospitals
for costs directly relating to GME. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 413.75 (titling as “Direct
GME payments: General requirements”). On May 15, 2014, the federal
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a proposed rule that
would slightly modify some of these regulations in light of Allina Health
Services v. Sebelius, 747 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2014). See U.S. Dep’t Health &
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§ 412.105,235 established new formulas for calculating two
different types of Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for
costs directly and indirectly relating to GME.
The first type of payment was designed to finance Medicare’s
share of the costs that directly relate to a teaching hospital’s
educational programs.236 Known as direct GME (DGME), these
costs include the stipends and fringe benefits of residents; the
salaries and fringe benefits of faculty who supervise residents;
malpractice insurance for residents; accreditation fees; the cost of
clerical personnel who work exclusively in GME administrative
offices; and allocated institutional overhead costs, including
space, maintenance, and electricity.237 COBRA specified that
these DGME payments were to be paid as a “pass-through”
outside of the diagnosis-related group (DRG) payments made
under the then-new Medicare inpatient prospective payment
system (PPS).238
Human Servs., Medicare Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,978, 28,307–08 (proposed
May 14, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Proposed Rule] (proposing to amend the
determination of the number of all full-time equivalent residents and weighted
number of full-time equivalent residents). HHS has not yet finalized this
proposed rule. This Article therefore references the current regulations and,
when relevant to the discussion, any proposed changes to these current
regulations.
235. 42 C.F.R. § 412.105 governs Medicare payments to teaching hospitals
for costs indirectly relating to GME. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.105 (titling as “Special
treatment: Hospitals that incur indirect costs for graduate medical education
programs”). On May 15, 2014, HHS issued a proposed rule that would slightly
modify 42 C.F.R. § 412.105. See 2014 Proposed Rule, supra note 206, at 28,302–
03 (proposing to amend payments for hospital programs incurring indirect costs
for GME). Again, HHS has not yet finalized this proposed rule. This Article
therefore references current 42 C.F.R. § 412.105 and, when relevant to the
discussion, any proposed changes to this regulation.
236. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing COBRA and new
GME requirements).
237. See, e.g., Catherine Dower, Health Policy Brief: Graduate Medical
Education, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Aug. 16, 2012, at 1, 2 [hereinafter RWJ BRIEF],
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_73.pdf
(discussing costs directly associated with GME); Mullen et al., Geography, supra
note 16, at 1915 (same); HHS PRIMER, supra note 49, at 6 (same).
238. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99272, 100 Stat. 82, § 9202. The Social Security Amendments of 1983 established a
prospective payment system (PPS) for hospitals. Social Security Amendments of
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.). The inpatient hospital PPS is a
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The second type of payment was designed to finance costs
indirectly associated with a teaching hospital’s GME activities,
such as the longer inpatient stays associated with the medically
complex patients who are treated at teaching hospitals; the
higher rates of test ordering by residents, who are still learning
to be efficient in their practice of medicine; and the lower
productivity of teaching hospital staff due to their educational
obligations.239 COBRA specified that payments for these indirect
medical education (IME) costs were to be reflected as an “add-on”
to each Medicare case’s DRG payment.240 The formulas that the
government currently uses to calculate Medicare’s payments to
teaching hospitals for their DGME and IME costs are complex
and are examined in more detail below.

per-case reimbursement system in which inpatient admission cases are divided
into relatively homogeneous categories called diagnosis-related groups (DRGS).
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK, ICN 006815, ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL INPATIENT
PROSPECTIVE SYSTEM, PAYMENT SYSTEM FACT SHEET SERIES [hereinafter
MEDICARE
IPPS],
http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/MedicareLearning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/AcutePaymtSysfctsht.pdf.
Under the PPS, “Medicare pays hospitals a flat rate per [DRG] case for inpatient
hospital care.” See OIG, MEDICARE HOSPITAL PPS 1-3, supra note 229, at 3
(summarizing the Medicare inpatient hospital PPS); MEDICARE IPPS, PAYMENT
SYSTEM FACT SHEET SERIES (same); see also CHANGING U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra
note 49, at 4 (historicizing the shift from a cost-based system of hospital
reimbursement to the PPS).
239. See, e.g., RWJ BRIEF, supra note 237, at 2 (providing examples of costs
that are indirectly associated with GME); Mullan et al., Geography, supra note
49, at 1915 (providing reasons why Congress believed teaching hospitals to be
more expensive); HHS PRIMER, supra note 49, at 6 (providing examples of costs
that are indirectly associated with GME).
240. See, e.g., COBRA, supra note 233, § 9104 (adding a provision titled
“Payments to Hospitals for Indirect Costs of Medical Education”); ASS’N OF AM.
MED. COLLS., BECOMING A NEW TEACHING HOSPITAL: A GUIDE TO THE MEDICARE
REQUIREMENTS 7 (2012) [hereinafter AAMC, NEW TEACHING HOSPITALS]
(explaining that IME payments are made “as a percentage add-on to [the] basic
Medicare per case MS-DRG payments”).
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A. Payments for Direct Graduate Medical Education Costs
Medicare DGME payments to teaching hospitals are
calculated using a three-factor formula.241 That is, a hospitalspecific per resident amount is multiplied by a weighted average
number of full-time equivalent residents,242 the product of which
is then multiplied by the hospital’s Medicare patient load.243 Each
factor in this formula will be discussed in turn.
1. The Per Resident Amount
The first factor is the teaching hospital’s per resident amount
(PRA).244 As a starting point, each hospital’s PRA is calculated by
dividing allowable DGME costs245 accrued during a base period—
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(h)(1)(A)–(B) (2012) (providing that Medicare
payments to teaching hospitals for DGME shall equal the product of the
“aggregate approved amount”); id. (defining the aggregate approved amount as
the product of the hospital’s approved full time equivalent (FTE) resident
amount and the weighted average number of FTE residents in the hospital’s
approved medical residency training program in a hospital’s cost reporting
period).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(1) (2012) (“[I]nstead of any amounts that are
otherwise payable . . . with respect to the reasonable costs of hospitals for direct
graduate medical education costs, the Secretary shall provide for payments for
such costs in accordance with paragraph (3) of this subsection.”); id.
§ 1395ww(h)(3)(A) (providing that Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for
DGME shall equal the product of the “aggregate approved amount” and the
hospital’s Medicare patient load); id. § 1395ww(h)(3)(B) (defining “aggregate
approved amount” as, for a hospital cost reporting period, the product of the
hospital’s approved FTE resident amount and the weighted average number of
FTE residents in the hospital’s approved medical residency training program in
that period); see also 42 C.F.R. § 413.76(a) (2013) (implementing these statutory
requirements in regulations).
243. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(3)(A) (providing that a hospital’s payment
amount per resident is the aggregate approved amount for that period
multiplied by the hospital’s Medicare patient load for that period); 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.76(a)–(b) (same).
244. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(a) (defining the per resident amount for the base
period).
245. See, e.g., Medicare Direct Graduate Education (DGME) Payments, ASS’N
OF AM. MED. CS., https://www.aamc.org/advocacy/gme/71152/gme_gme0001.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (listing allowable DGME costs) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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for most hospitals, October 1, 1983, through September 30, 1984
(FY 1984) but, for some hospitals, FY 1985246—by the base
period’s average number of full-time equivalent residents
working in all areas of the hospital complex.247 Using an
oversimplified example, if a hypothetical teaching hospital had
allowable base year (FY 1984) costs of $480,000 while operating
one residency program with an average of ten residents working
in the hospital complex, the hospital’s starting PRA would be
$480,000 divided by ten, or $48,000.248 The PRA is then updated
on an annual basis for inflation.249 For example, a teaching
hospital that had a PRA of $48,000 in FY 1984 may now have an
updated PRA of $60,000.250
A couple of important points relating to the PRA are worth
noting. First, financial arrangements between teaching hospitals
and medical schools vary widely.251 The lack of consistency in
these arrangements makes it extremely difficult to accurately
and appropriately determine or allocate the costs of GME.252 “For
example, the costs associated with faculty supervision of
residents at a given institution may be wholly assigned to the
246. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.75(b) (defining base period); id. § 413.77(a)(1)(i)–(ii)
(providing instructions for finding the per resident amount); Medicare Program,
Final Rules and Interim Final Rule with Comment Period, 74 Fed. Reg. 43754,
43908 (Aug. 27, 2009) (explaining the base period); see generally HHS PRIMER,
supra note 49, at 15 (same).
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(2)(A) (explaining that the Secretary
determines the hospital’s average amount recognized as reasonable for each
FTE resident during the base period); 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(a)(1)(i)–(ii) (providing
the manner in which DGME costs for each FTE are determined by determining
the allowable GME costs and dividing that number by the base period’s average
number of FTE residents).
248. See Gentile & Buckley, Medicare Reimbursement, supra note 231, at 146 (providing mathematical examples of hospital-specific PRA determinations).
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(2)(B)–(D) (2012) (requiring the Secretary to
update each average PRA by the percentage increase in the consumer price
index during the 12-month cost reporting period); 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(c) (2013)
(updating PRAs with reference to the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (CPI-U), as compiled by the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics); id. § 413.75(b) (defining CPI-U).
250. See Gentile & Buckley, Medicare Reimbursement, supra note 231, at 146 (providing examples of inflation update calculations).
251. HHS PRIMER, supra note 49, at 6.
252. Id.
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affiliated medical school. In another location, the same cost may
be assigned to the teaching hospital through a contractual
relationship.”253 The result, at least historically, was wide
variations in PRAs—for example, from $60,000 to $120,000—
across training institutions.254
Second, once the government establishes a teaching
hospital’s PRA using the principles set forth above, that PRA is
permanent other than an annual inflation update.255 Unless and
until Congress establishes new rules for determining PRAs, a
teaching hospital’s PRA will not change even if the hospital’s
current GME costs are significantly higher than its base year (FY
1984) GME costs and even if the hospital’s GME costs increase
faster than inflation.256 Because teaching hospitals’ PRAs are tied
to allowable GME costs in a base year that is now thirty-one
years old, it is fair to state that the PRAs are out of date.257 In
Part VI, I propose to correct Congress’s outdated rules for
determining hospital-specific PRAs.
Third, each teaching hospital’s PRA is based on allowable
DGME costs.258 Some costs are not considered allowable and
cannot be counted for purposes of determining the PRA.259 For
example, if a community has undertaken to bear the direct costs
of GME through community support, the costs are not considered
GME costs to the hospital for purposes of Medicare payment.260
253. Id.
254. Id. at 15–16.
255. See AAMC, NEW TEACHING HOSPITALS, supra note 240, at 6 (noting that
the hospital’s established PRA becomes its permanent PRA, updated only by an
annual inflation factor).
256. See id. (“This PRA will not change, even if [the hospital’s] GME costs
increase faster than inflation.”).
257. See ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., MEDICARE PAYMENTS FOR GRADUATE MED.
EDUC. 2 (2006), http://www.ttuhsc.edu/som/gme/documents/MedicarePayments
forGME.pdf (“Since the DGME payment is based on historical costs, it is not
related to the costs that the hospital currently incurs for training residents.”).
258. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(a)(1)(i)–(ii) (2013) (providing instructions for
finding the per resident amount: determine the allowable GME costs for the
reporting period and then divide the costs by the average number of FTE
residents working in all areas of the hospital complex during that period).
259. See id. (listing excluded GME costs).
260. See id. § 413.81(a)(1) (“If the community has undertaken to bear the
costs of medical education through community support, the costs are not
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Similarly, the costs of training residents that constitute a
redistribution261 of costs from an educational institution to a
teaching hospital are also not considered GME costs to the
hospital for purposes of Medicare payment.262 Known as
“community support and redistribution,” these principles are
designed to implement Congress’s intent that the Medicare
program finance GME only until the community undertakes the
same mission.263
Fourth, due to a congressional freeze on inflation updates on
PRAs for non-primary care residents in FYs 1994 and 1995, 264
most teaching hospitals have two PRAs; that is, one PRA for
primary care residents265 and obstetrics and gynecology residents
and a second PRA for non-primary care and non-obstetrics and

considered GME costs to the hospital for purposes of Medicare payment.”).
261. See id. § 413.75(b)(5) (“Redistribution of costs occurs when a hospital
counts FTE residents in medical residency programs and the costs of the
program had previously been incurred by an educational institution.”).
262. See id. § 413.81(a)(2) (“The costs of training residents that constitute a
redistribution of costs from an educational institution to the hospital are not
considered GME costs.”).
263. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (“Educational activities
enhance the quality of care in an institution, and it is intended, until the
community undertakes to bear such education costs in some other way, that a
part of the net cost of such activities (including stipends of trainees, as well as
compensation of teachers and other costs) should be borne to an appropriate
extent by [Medicare Part A] . . . .” (emphasis added)).
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(2)(D)(ii) (2012) (instructing not to update
the FTE resident amount for certain types of residents for cost reporting periods
beginning during FYs 1994 and 1995); 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(c)(2) (2013) (stating
that, for cost reporting periods beginning during FY 1994 and 1995, “each
hospital’s per resident amount for the previous cost reporting period will not be
adjusted for any resident FTEs” of certain types).
265. See id. § 413.75(b) (stating that a “primary care resident is a resident
who is formally accepted, enrolled, and participating in an approved medical
residency training program in family medicine, general internal medicine,
general pediatrics, preventative medicine, geriatric medicine or osteopathic
general practice”).
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gynecology residents.266 New teaching hospitals with programs
that began after 1995 would only have one PRA.267
Fifth, later pieces of federal legislation established certain
PRA “floors” and “ceilings” designed to reduce large variations in
PRA amounts.268 That is, the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP
Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (BBRA) and the
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvements and
Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) established in 1999269 and reestablished in 2000270 certain PRA floors of 70% and 85%,
respectively, of a locality-adjusted national average PRA.271 In
addition, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) provided that hospitals with
PRAs above 140% of the locality-adjusted national average would
not receive updates through FY 2013.272
Finally, for a hospital that did not have an approved medical
residency training program in FY 1984 but now has a program,
the PRA generally is determined by the lower of (1) the new
program’s actual GME costs per resident or (2) the average of the
PRAs of surrounding teaching hospitals in the same geographic

266. See supra note 264 and accompanying text (stating that, for FYs 1994
and 1995, “each hospital’s per resident amount . . . will not be adjusted for any
FTEs who are not either a primary care resident or an obstetrics and gynecology
resident”).
267. See generally id. (instructing not to update the FTE resident amount
for certain resident for cost reporting periods beginning during FY 1994 and
1995).
268. See Mullen et al., Geography, supra note 16, at 1915 (“To reduce
unwarranted variations in direct GME payments, for instance, the Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 established a ceiling and floor for these
payments made to hospitals.”).
269. Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 311, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) [hereinafter BBRA].
270. Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 511, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) [hereinafter
BIPA].
271. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(d)(2)(iii)(A)–(B) (2013) (codifying the regulations
that implement these floors).
272. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 502, 117 Stat. 2066, 2290 (2003) (revising the
IME adjustment percentage); 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(d)(2)(iii)(B)(1)–(5) (codifying
the regulation implementing this ceiling in the Code of Federal Regulations).
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wage area.273 New program PRAs are determined in the first year
of the program if residents are on duty during the first month of
the cost reporting period; if not, the PRA is determined in the
second year of the program.274
2. The Number of Residents
The PRA is the first factor in the formula used to calculate
Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for their DGME costs.275
The second factor in the formula is the weighted average number
of full-time equivalent residents276 training in an approved
medical residency program and working in the hospital complex
or, under certain circumstances, nonhospital locations.277 Each
element of this factor will be examined in turn.
First, the “number” of allopathic and osteopathic residents
that teaching hospitals may claim for DGME (and, as discussed
infra at Part V.B, for IME) is generally capped at the number of
residents counted on a hospital’s most recent cost report ending
on or before December 31, 1996.278 Added by Congress in the
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(2)(F) (2012) (providing that the Secretary
shall determine the appropriate approved FTE resident amount for hospitals
that did not have an approved medical residency training program for a cost
period beginning during FY 1984); 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(e)(1)(i)–(ii) (stating that
the per resident amount is based on the lower of the hospital’s actual cost per
resident during the hospital’s base year cost reporting period and the updated
weighted mean value of per resident amounts of all hospitals located in the
same geographic wage area).
274. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(e)(1) (“[If] the residents are not on duty during
the first month of that period, the fiscal intermediary establishes a per resident
amount for the hospital using the information from the first cost reporting
period immediately following the cost reporting period during which the hospital
participates.”).
275. See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing the PRA).
276. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.75(b) (“Residents are interns, residents, or fellows
who are formally accepted, enrolled, and participating in an approved medical
residency program, including programs in osteopathy, dentistry and podiatry, as
required in order to become certified by the appropriate specialty board.”).
277. Id. § 413.78.
278. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(4)(F) (2012) (stating that the number of
allopathic and osteopathic residence may not exceed the number of such fulltime equivalent residents for the hospital’s most recent cost reporting period);
42 C.F.R. §413.79(c)(2)(i) (2013) (same).
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Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), 279 these allopathic and
osteopathic resident caps responded to then-current projections
of widespread physician surpluses across the United States. 280
Although later physician workforce analyses forecasted
shortages, as discussed in detail in Part II, Congress never
removed the caps. 281 Today, these caps significantly limit the
ability of teaching hospitals located in physician-shortage
areas to grow their residency programs and train physicians
who might stay and practice medicine in needed specialty
areas within the teaching hospital’s catchment area.282 Like
the hospital-specific PRAs, the BBA caps are permanent unless
and until Congress changes them. 283 In Part VI, I propose
reconfiguring these caps in order to increase resident-topopulation ratios in certain physician shortage areas.
Second, the “weighted” number of residents generally
means that residents in their initial residency period (IRP),
defined as the minimum number of years necessary for
specialty Board eligibility, 284 are each counted as a full (or
279. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w–4 (2012)).
280. See, e.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 54, at 8 (“[T]he Balanced Budget Act of
1997 limited the number of resident physicians that Medicare was willing to
finance. Policymakers basically believed at that point that the country didn’t
need to be producing as many doctors as it was.”).
281. See, e.g., id. (referencing the Association of American Medical Colleges’
projection in 2006 of widespread physician shortages).
282. See Alex Wayne, Doctor Shortage May Swell to 130,000 with Cap,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2012 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0829/doctor-shortage-may-swell-to-130-000-with-u-s-cap.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2014) (explaining how medical schools are not expanding admissions because
the number of applicants for resident positions already exceeds the number of
positions available due to the fact that hospitals are not adding more residency
positions because the federal funding is capped) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
283. See Gentile & Buckley, Medicare Reimbursement, supra note 231, at 143–14-13 (discussing the caps); Ronald S. Connelly, CMS Prevents Changes to
Medicare Resident Caps, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. MAG. (Jan. 2014),
http://www.hfma.org/Content.aspx?id=20976 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
(“Unless Congress acts or a court invalidates CMS’s revised reopening
regulation, GME funding is likely to remain fairly stagnant.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
284. 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(a) (2013); see AAMC, NEW TEACHING HOSPITALS,
supra note 240, at 5 (“The IRP for family medicine is three years, for example,
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1.0)285 FTE, while residents training beyond their IRP are
counted as a half (or 0.5) FTE.286 Congress designed this
weighting feature to discourage the growth of specialty and
subspecialty residency positions during a period when there was
a perceived need for a greater number of generalists.287
Third, the “average” number of residents means that a
hospital’s FTE count in a given year is not a discrete
determination but is actually based on the average of the count in
the current cost reporting period and the counts in the two
preceding periods.288 Also added by Congress in 1997 in the BBA,
this feature is known as the “three-year rolling average” and has
the effect of softly reducing a teaching hospital’s FTE cap over
time if a hospital fails to fill all of its Medicare-funded resident
positions.289
Fourth, for residents to be counted for Medicare payment
purposes, they must be training in an approved medical residency
program290 and be working somewhere in the hospital complex or
in certain nonprovider settings.291 The term “hospital complex” is
and the IRP for surgery is five years.”).
285. 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(b)(1); AAMC, NEW TEACHING HOSPITALS, supra note
240, at 5 (noting that one resident in his or her IRP usually will not equal a full
(1.0) FTE because the resident usually will not spend 100% of his time in a
single hospital and certain categories of time (e.g., certain research time) must
be excluded from the FTE count).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(4)(C) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(b)(2).
287. See, e.g., Rich et al., Medicare Financing, supra note 231, at 285 (“This
policy was intended to constrain the growth of specialty positions.”).
288. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(4)(G)(i) (“[T]he total number of full-time
equivalent residents for determining a hospital’s graduate medical education
payment shall equal the average of the actual full-time equivalent resident
counts for the cost reporting period and the preceding two cost reporting
periods.”); 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(d)(2) (“[T]he hospital’s weighted FTE count is
equal to the average of the weighted FTE count for the payment year cost
reporting period and the preceding two cost reporting periods.”).
289. See HHS PRIMER, supra note 49, at 17 (noting that the BBA employs “a
three year rolling average for calculating number of residents . . . to soften the
impact of reductions in the number of residents”).
290. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.75(b) (2013) (defining approved medical residency
program).
291. Id. § 413.78(a), (g); see also 2014 Proposed Rule, supra note 234, at
28307 (proposing to prohibit 42 C.F.R. § 413.78 from being applied in a manner
that would allow for certain re-openings of certain settled cost reports).

I NEED A DOCTOR

2479

broadly defined as any area that meets the federal government’s
provider-based criteria, including distinct-part units and
hospital-based providers, as well as nursery, research, and other
non-reimbursable cost centers.292 The term “nonprovider settings”
includes certain freestanding clinics, nursing homes, and
physician offices used in connection with an approved residency
program if (1) the residents are engaged in patient care
activities293 (as well as certain nonpatient care activities that
occur in a nonprovider setting that is primarily engaged in
furnishing patient care)294 and (2) the hospital incurs the costs of
the stipends and fringe benefits of the resident during the time
the residents spend in that nonprovider setting.295
Fifth, recent legislation has reduced certain hospitals’
residency slots and redistributed those slots to other hospitals
located in certain geographic areas.296 That is, ACA reduced some
hospitals’ FTE resident caps by 65% of the excess resident slots if
the hospitals’ reference resident levels were less than their
otherwise applicable resident limits.297 Then, ACA redistributed
those resident slots to certain other qualifying hospitals that
submitted timely applications for them.298 ACA specified that the
newly gained slots were to be redistributed to other hospitals in
the following manner: (1) 70% of the resident slots were to be
distributed to hospitals located in States with resident-topopulation ratios in the lowest quartile (i.e., Montana, Idaho,
Alaska, Wyoming, South Dakota, Nevada, North Dakota,
Mississippi, Indiana, Puerto Rico, Florida, Georgia, and Arizona);
292. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(a)(1)(i)–(ii) (defining “hospital complex”).
293. See id. § 413.75(b) (defining patient care activities).
294. See id. § 413.75(b) (defining nonprovider setting that is primarily
engaged in furnishing patient care).
295. Id. § 413.78(g)(1).
296. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 5503, 124 Stat. 119, 587 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (providing for the
distribution of additional residency positions).
297. See id. (providing for the reduction of FTE resident caps); 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.79(m) (2013) (stating how reduction to the FTE resident cap due to unused
FTE resident slots is determined).
298. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(n) (stating how an increase in an otherwise
applicable resident cap is determined).
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and (2) 30% of the resident slots were to be distributed: (a) to
hospitals located in a state, territory, or district that were among
the top ten in terms of the ratio of Health Professional Shortage
Area (HPSA) population to the total population (i.e., Louisiana,
Mississippi, Puerto Rico, New Mexico, South Dakota, the District
of Columbia, Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Alabama),
and/or (b) to hospitals located in rural areas.299 As an illustrative
example, two Nevada hospitals received resident cap increases
under this process.300 Renown Regional Medical Center located in
Reno, Nevada (Renown) received twenty-one additional resident
slots, and University Medical Center located in Las Vegas,
Nevada (UMC) received fifty additional resident slots.301 In Part
VI, I applaud ACA’s attempt to redistribute resident slots to
geographic areas with low resident-to-population ratios and to
HPSAs and rural areas.302 The discrete redistributions that
occurred, however, were insufficient to affect the large-scale
changes needed to remedy current and looming physician
shortages.303
Sixth, for hospitals with new medical residency training
programs304 that otherwise would have caps of zero due to a lack
299. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 5503, 124 Stat. 119, 589 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (specifying the
different regions for the distribution of residency positions).
300. See Direct Graduate Medical Education (DGME), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERV. (Aug. 4, 2014 4:06 PM), www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Feefor-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/dgme.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014
9:08 AM) (providing an excel spreadsheet listing provider numbers and their
corresponding IME and DGME reduction amount) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
301. See id. (listing resident slots at various medical centers).
302. Infra Part VI.
303. Id.
304. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1) (2013) (defining a new medical residency
training program as a medical residency that receives initial accreditation by
the appropriate accrediting body or begins training residents on or after
January 1, 1995); Medicare Program Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 53258, 53416
(Aug. 31, 2012) (explaining that existing medical residency training programs
cannot manipulate this definition to re-classify themselves as new medical
residency training programs); id. (existing medical school cannot close a
program in an old hospital and move the program to a new hospital in order to
increase its number of FTE residents); see also Medicare Program Final Rules
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of residents at the time Congress set the caps in 1997, federal law
does permit a cap adjustment to be made based on the sum of the
products of the highest number of FTE residents in any program
year during the fifth305 year of the hospital’s first new program’s
existence and the number of years in which residents are
expected to complete the program based on the minimum IRP for
each type of program.306 Stated another way, new teaching
hospitals’ resident caps generally will equal the sum, for all
programs, of the largest number of FTE residents in any postgraduate year (PGY) during the fifth and final year of the first
new program’s cap-building window, multiplied by the IRP for
that residency program.307 The cap adjustment may not, however,
exceed the number of accredited slots available to the hospital for
the new program.308
Unfortunately, teaching hospitals that would like to start
small—perhaps by starting one new residency program every
several years—in order to carefully and thoughtfully build sound
training programs with competitive residents and sought-after
and Interim Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 43754, 43908–10 (Aug. 27, 2009)
(clarifying what CMS considers in determining whether an allegedly new
hospital is really new); id. (explaining that CMS makes case-by-case
determinations regarding whether a particular residency training program
constitutes a new medical residency training program and does not specify the
number or combination of factors that will contribute to a program’s failure to
be deemed a new medical residency training program).
305. See 42 C.F.R. §413.79(e)(1) (stating that the cap may be adjusted for
new medical residency training programs that began training residents on or
after January 1, 1995, but before October 1, 2012); id. (stating that the
adjustment is based on the product of the highest number of residents in any
program year during the third year of the first program’s existence and the
number of years for the residents’ IRPs) (emphasis added); 77 Fed. Reg. at
53416–17 (acknowledging provider concerns and explanations for why teaching
hospitals need more than three years to grow residency programs).
306. 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1); see also 2014 Proposed Rule, supra note 234, at
28146 (proposing to clarify the interaction of this regulation with the three-year
rolling average requirement).
307. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1) ([T]he hospital’s . . . resident cap . . . may be
adjusted for new residency training programs based on the sum of the products
of the highest number of FTE residents . . . during the fifth year of the first new
program's existence and the number of years in which residents . . . complete
the program.”).
308. See id. (“The adjustment to the cap may not exceed the number of
accredited slots available to the hospital for the new program.”).
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teaching physicians are penalized because the government will
set each hospital’s cap in the fifth year of the hospital’s first new
training program.309 To maximize Medicare reimbursement, the
federal rules contemplate teaching hospitals starting a number of
residency programs all at the same time and then growing them
as quickly as possible within a five-year period.310 The rules
would allow this growth without regard to accreditation
requirements, which may not permit this scenario, and without
regard to the quality of residents matched, the expertise of
teaching faculty hired, or the likely administrative overload
and/or inefficiencies that result from starting so many new
programs at once.311 In Part VI, I propose to amend these rules.
So far, this section has analyzed each element in the second
factor—the number of residents—in the formula used to calculate
Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for their DGME costs. A
final note regarding the application of these rules to rural
hospitals is important. That is, the BBA-established caps apply
less stringently to hospitals located in rural areas.312 For
example, hospitals located in rural areas are capped at 130% (and
not 100%) of the hospital’s unweighted FTE count for the most
recent cost reporting period ending on or before December 31,
1996.313 By further example, rural hospitals314 with less than 250
beds315 are exempt from reductions in resident caps that
otherwise would apply due to unused FTE slots.316 In addition, if
309. See AAMC, NEW TEACHING HOSPITALS, supra note 240, at 10
(articulating that hospitals should “not only think about [the] initial number of
residents . . . but also about [the] ultimate desired number of residents”).
310. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1) (2013) (explaining the residency program
cap is put into place in the fifth year of a new program).
311. See id. (omitting any potential factors or problems in beginning several
programs at one time).
312. See id. § 413.79(c)(2) (providing examples of how rules apply to rural
hospitals).
313. Id. § 413.79(c)(2)(i).
314. See id. § 412.105(a)(1)–(5) (identifying the conditions under which a
hospital located in an urban area could be reclassified as a rural hospital).
315. See generally id. § 412.105(b) (providing instructions regarding how to
count beds).
316. See id. § 413.79(c)(3)(i) (“A rural hospital . . . with less than 250
beds . . . is exempt from any reduction to the otherwise applicable FTE resident
cap limit . . . .”).
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a rural hospital participates in a new medical residency training
program, the hospital’s unweighted FTE cap is calculated using
the highest number of FTE residents in any program year during
the fifth year of each new program’s existence, and not the fifth
year of the first new program’s existence.317 Moreover, a rural
hospital that is later redesignated as an urban hospital may
retain the increases to its FTE resident cap that it received under
the provisions discussed above while it was located in the rural
area.318 Finally, hospitals with rural tracks319 can include in their
FTE count residents in those rural tracks without regard to the
hospitals’ otherwise applicable FTE caps320 up to a rural track
FTE limitation.321
3. Medicare Patient Load: Summary
In addition to the hospital-specific PRA and the weighted
average number of FTE residents, the third and final factor used
to calculate Medicare DGME payments is the hospital’s Medicare
patient load.322 A teaching hospital’s Medicare patient load is the
total number of hospital inpatient days during the cost reporting
period that are attributable to patients for whom payment is
made under Medicare Part A323 divided by total hospital
317. See id. § 413.79(e)(3) (explaining the policy for calculating a rural
hospital’s FTE cap when it participates in a new medical residency training
program).
318. See id. § 413.79(c)(6) (providing rules for FTE resident caps for rural
hospitals redesignated as urban); see also U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs.,
Medicare Program, Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 27978, 28307 (May 14, 2014)
(proposing to amend this regulation).
319. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.75(b) (2013) (defining rural track and integrated
rural track).
320. See id. § 413.79(k) (“[A]n urban hospital . . . with a rural track . . . may
include in its FTE count residents in those rural tracks, in addition to the
residents subject to its FTE cap . . . .”).
321. See id. § 413.75(b) (defining rural track FTE limitation); U.S. Dep’t
Health & Human Servs., Medicare Program, Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 27978,
28307 (May 14, 2014) (proposing to amend this definition slightly).
322. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.76(b) (listing the next step in the formula as
multiplying by the hospital’s Medicare patient load).
323. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (distinguishing Medicare
Parts A, B, C, and D).
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inpatient days.324 Factoring a hospital’s Medicare patient load
into the equation is designed to ensure that Medicare pays the
teaching hospital more when the hospital cares for a large
number of Medicare beneficiaries but only its fair share when the
teaching hospital cares for predominantly privately insured
patients or other non-Medicare patients.
In summary, Medicare DGME payments are calculated using
a three-factor formula.325 That is, an updated hospital-specific
PRA is multiplied by a weighted average number of FTEs, the
product of which is then multiplied by the hospital’s Medicare
patient load, as illustrated by the following formula:
(PRAInflation/Floors/Ceilings x WFTE1996Cap) x MPL
where, (1) PRAInflation/Floors/Ceilings represents the hospital’s per
resident amount updated for inflation as limited by the BBRA,
BIPA, and MMA floors and ceilings; (2) WFTE1996Cap represents
the three-year rolling average of weighted resident FTE counts
subject to the 1996 FTE resident cap; and (3) MPL represents the
hospital’s Medicare patient load.326
An oversimplified example may be used to show how
Medicare calculates an annual payment to a teaching hospital for
the costs of its DGME. Assume for FY 2014 that a hypothetical
teaching hospital has (1) an updated PRA of $60,000;327 (2) a
DGME resident cap of 100 FTEs, all of whom the hospital is
training, although seventy-five of these residents are training in
their IRPs and twenty-five are training beyond their IRPs; and
(3) a Medicare patient load of 30%. In this example,328 Medicare
324. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.75(b) (defining a teaching hospital’s Medicare
patient load).
325. See id. § 413.76(a)–(b) (explaining the formula for Medicare DGME
payments).
326. See id. § 413.76 (detailing the steps in the formula for Medicare DGME
payments).
327. See supra notes 245–54 and accompanying text (explaining how a
hypothetical hospital may have an updated PRA of $60,000).
328. This hypothetical is oversimplified because not all residents, even those
working in their IRPs, will spend all of their time at one hospital complex or at
an associated ambulatory site. Therefore, this example overstates the amount of
Medicare reimbursement because it assumes that each resident spends all of his
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will pay the hospital $1,575,000 for its FY 2014 DGME costs, as
follows:
[1.0(75 x $60,000)] x .3 = $1,350,000 (Payment for residents
training in their IRPs)
[0.5(25 x $60,000)] x .3 = $225,000 (Payment for residents
training beyond IRPs)
_____________________________________________________________
= $1,575,000 (DGME payment to the
hospital for FY 2014)329
B. Payments for Indirect Medical Education Costs
In addition to payments for costs that are directly associated
with GME, Medicare also makes payments to teaching hospitals
for costs that are indirectly associated with GME. Known as IME
payments (or adjustments),330 these payments have their roots in
Medicare’s early cost limits that were established in the 1970s.331
As government-imposed payment limits for hospitals’ routine
costs grew more stringent, researchers responded by showing
that teaching hospitals had higher costs than non-teaching

or her time at one teaching hospital complex or associated ambulatory site. In
addition, many teaching hospitals train residents above their caps. Although
Medicare will not reimburse teaching hospitals that train above-cap residents,
most hospitals do train above-cap residents and this hypothetical assumes that
the hospital trains a number of residents that exactly equals its cap.
329. Cf. THE COMING SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at 116 (providing additional
illustrative examples of calculations of Medicare payments to teaching
hospitals).
330. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Acute Care Hospital
Inpatient Prospective Payment System, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES PAYMENT SYSTEM FACT SHEET SERIES 4 (Apr. 2013),
http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN
/MLNProducts/downloads/AcutePaymtSysfctsht.pdf (illustrating and describing
the IME payment as a policy adjustment for qualifying hospitals).
331. Medicare Indirect Medical Education (IME) Payments, ASS’N OF AM.
MED. COLLS., https://www.aamc.org/advocacy/gme/71150/gme_gme0002.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014) [hereinafter AAMC, IME PAYMENTS] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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hospitals even after DGME costs were taken into account. 332
Researchers specifically showed that teaching hospitals’ internand resident-to-bed (IRB) ratios were related to increases in
hospital patient care costs.333
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA),
signed into law by President Reagan on September 3, 1982, was
the first piece of federal legislation to recognize that teaching
hospitals needed to be assisted with these higher costs and
excused from otherwise applicable cost limits.334 As explained by
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) in December 1982:
The indirect costs of graduate medical education are higher
patient care costs incurred by hospitals with medical
education programs. Although it is not known precisely what
part of these higher costs are due to teaching (more tests, more
procedures, etc.), and what part is due to other factors (the
particular types of patients which a teaching hospital may
attract), the Medicare cost reports clearly demonstrate that
costs per case are higher in teaching hospitals.
It is also clear that the mere presence of interns and residents
in an institution puts extra demands on other staff and leads
to the existence of higher staffing levels. The process of
graduate medical education results in very intensive
treatment regimens. Again, the relative importance of the
332. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan, Roger D. Feldman & Bruce Steinwald, Effect
of Teaching on Hospital Costs, 2 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 1–28 (1983) (estimating the
effect of undergraduate and graduate medical education on teaching hospital
costs using a national sample of 367 hospitals observed in 1974 and 1977 and
reporting that non-physician expenses in teaching hospitals are up to 20%
higher than in nonteaching hospitals); Mullan et al., Geography, supra note 16,
at 1915 (referencing 1983 studies finding that teaching hospitals’ costs were
5.69% higher than the costs of nonteaching hospitals for every 10% increase in
the ratio of interns and residents to beds); Lane Koenig et al., Estimating the
Mission-Related Costs of Teaching Hospitals, 22(6) HEALTH AFFAIRS 112, 112–22
(Nov. 2003) (concluding that limitations on government financing of GME may
need to be reassessed in light of the higher costs associated with teaching
hospitals).
333. See AAMC, IME PAYMENTS, supra note 331 (“Researchers found that a
hospital’s IRB ratio was related to an increase in hospital patient care costs.”).
334. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, § 101, Pub. L. No. 97248, 96 Stat. 324 (Sept. 3, 1982) (amending section 1886 of the Act to provide
that, “The Secretary shall provide . . . adjustments . . . necessary to take into
account . . . the special needs of medical . . . education costs . . . .”).
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various reasons for the higher costs observed in teaching
hospitals is difficult to identify precisely. However, there is no
question that hospitals with teaching programs have higher
patient care costs than hospitals without. 335

Once Congress and HHS recognized that teaching hospitals
had higher costs than non-teaching hospitals even after taking
DGME costs into account,336 the next question became the size of
the percentage add-on that should be applied to each base DRG
payment. The Secretary initially estimated that Medicare
inpatient operating costs per case increased approximately 5.79%
with each 10% increase in the number of residents per hospital
bed; however, this percentage estimation was later increased,
then re-calculated, and then lowered by President George W.
Bush in the MMA.337
Today, section 1886 of the Act and its implementing
regulations set forth the following formula for calculating
teaching hospital IME adjustments:
IME Multiplier x [(1+IRB ratio)0.405 -1]338
Each factor in this formula will be discussed in turn. The
first factor, the IME Multiplier, is currently set at 1.35.339 An
IME Multiplier of 1.35 means that for every ten residents per
335. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, SECRETARY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT FOR MEDICARE 48
(1982); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-25, at 140–41 (1983) (explaining the purpose of
the Medicare IME adjustment); S. REP. NO. 98-23, at 52 (1983) (offering another
explanation for the purpose of the Medicare IME adjustment).
336. See, e.g., Ian S. Metzler et al., The Critical State of Graduate Medical
Education Funding, 97(11) BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 9, 9 n.8 (2012),
http://bulletin.facs.org/2012/11/critical-state-of-gme-funding (suggesting that
only a certain percentage of IME payments can be analytically justified) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
337. See MMA, supra note 222, § 502 (revising the IME adjustment
percentage); Gentile & Buckley, Medicare Reimbursement, supra note 231, at
14-2 (summarizing Congressional changes to the IME adjustment over time).
338. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(B)(ii) (2012) (explaining the formula for
calculating
the
indirect
teaching
adjustment factor);
42
C.F.R.
§§ 412.105(d)(3)(xii), 412.105(e)(1) (2013) (describing formula for IME payment
under prospective payment system); 2014 Proposed Rule, supra note 234, at
28302 (proposing changes to 42 C.F.R. § 412.105(a) and (f)).
339. 42 C.F.R. § 412.105(d)(3)(xii).
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one-hundred beds, a teaching hospital will receive a 5.5% add-on
payment to its basic DRG payment.340
The second factor, the IRB ratio, is designed to measure the
hospital’s teaching intensity; that is, the ratio of the number of
interns and residents to beds.341 Starting from the end of the IRB
ratio, at the “B,” the number of beds is generally based on the
number of available beds during the cost reporting period divided
by the number of days in the cost reporting period.342 Several
categories of beds are, however, excluded from the available bed
count.343
Moving to the beginning of the IRB ratio, to the “IR,” interns
and residents are generally, but with some exceptions, counted
and capped in the same manner for IME purposes as they are for
DGME purposes.344 One exception is that fellows training beyond
the IRP are not weighted at 50% for IME payment purposes, so
each fellow will count as 1.0 FTE in calculating a teaching
hospital’s IRB.345 A second exception is that interns and residents
can only be counted for IME if they are in the part of the hospital
subject to PPS, they are in the outpatient department of a
hospital that satisfies a certain provider-based status, or they are
in a nonprovider setting and are engaged in certain patient care
activities.346 A third exception is that the community support and
340. See Indirect Medical Education (IME), CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES (Aug. 4, 2014, 4:07 PM), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/Indirect-Medical-Educa
tion-IME.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (“The formula multiplier of 1.35
represents a 5.5 percent increase in IME payment for every 10 percent increase
in the resident-to-bed ratio.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
341. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.105(a)(1) (listing the hospital’s resident-to-bed ratio
as a factor in calculating CMS payment).
342. See id. § 412.105(b) (“[T]he number of beds in a hospital is determined
by counting the number of available bed days during the cost reporting period
and dividing that number by the number of days in the cost reporting period.”).
343. See id. § 412.105(b)(1)–(6) (listing the categories of beds excluded from
the available bed count, such as beds in the “healthy newborn nursery”).
344. See id. § 412.105(f) (defining how to determine the number of interns
and residents); 2014 Proposed Rule, supra note 234, at 28302–03 (proposing
changes to this regulation).
345. AAMC, NEW TEACHING HOSPITALS, supra note 240, at 8.
346. 42 C.F.R. § 412.105(f)(1)(ii)(A), (B), (E) (2013); see also id.
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redistribution of cost requirements applicable to DGME347 do not
apply for purposes of counting residents for IME payments in the
hospital setting, but they do apply for purposes of claiming
residents for IME payments in nonprovider settings.348 Finally, a
hospital’s IRB ratio in any given year is also limited, or capped, to
its computed value in the prior year after accounting for the cap
on the allopathic and osteopathic residents.349
An example might help illustrate how Medicare calculates
IME payments to teaching hospitals. Assume a hypothetical
teaching hospital has (1) 170 interns, residents, and fellow FTEs;
(2) 666 beds; and (3) that CMS will be making a payment to the
hospital for MS-DRG350 227 (cardiac defibrillator implant without
cardiac catheter and without major complications or comorbidities) at a payment rate of $29,000. To determine the
teaching hospital’s IME percentage add-on, the following formula
is used:
IME Multiplier x [(1+IRB ratio)0.405 -1] = percentage add-on
Applied to the hypothetical teaching hospital described above, the
hospital’s IME percentage add-on is
1.35 x [(1+170/666)0.405-1] = 13%
After determining the hospital’s IME percentage add-on, the final
step is to apply the percentage add-on to the particular cardiac
defibrillator implant DRG case:
§ 412.105(f)(1)(iii)(B)–(C) (stating that resident time spent in activities not
related to the treatment or diagnosis of a particular patient is not countable for
IMA purposes); id. § 413.75(b) (providing relevant definitions).
347. See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text (discussing the DGME).
348. See Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2004 Rates, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,436, 45,444 (Aug.
1, 2003) (explaining rules for training in nonhospital settings).
349. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.105(a)(1)(i) (“[T]his ratio may not exceed the ratio
for the hospital’s most recent prior cost reporting period after accounting for the
cap on the number of allopathic and osteopathic full-time equivalent
residents . . . .”).
350. Beginning with discharges occurring on or after October 1, 2007, CMS
began using a new DRG system called Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related
Groups (MS-DRGs) to better account for severity of illness and resource
consumption for Medicare beneficiaries. MEDICARE IPPS, supra note 238, at 2.
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$29,000 x 13% = $3,770

That is, the hypothetical teaching hospital will receive an
additional payment of $3,770 for this DRG case to compensate
the hospital for the additional patient care costs associated with
being a teaching hospital.351
This Part V has examined the history and current regulation
of Medicare funding of GME. Although Medicare is the largest
federal governmental source of GME funding, the federal
government also funds GME through several additional programs
and grants, including the Medicaid Program,352 the Teaching
Health Center Graduate Medical Education Program,353 the
Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical Education Payment
Program,354 and certain Primary Care Residency Expansion
grants.355 The federal government further finances GME through
contributions from other agencies, including the Department of
Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the National
Institutes of Health.356 Some private insurers also support GME
to some degree through payments they negotiate with teaching
hospitals.357 In addition, some teaching hospitals are obtaining
financing from nontraditional sources, including by forging
351. See AAMC, NEW TEACHING HOSPITALS, supra note 240, at 8 (providing a
similar example and explaining why examples such as these are over
simplified).
352. See generally Tim M. Henderson, Medicaid’s Role in Financing
Graduate Medical Education, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 221 (2000) (providing a
detailed discussion of state Medicaid approaches to financing GME).
353. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Teaching Health Center Graduate
Medical Education (THCGME), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/grants/teachinghealthcenters/index.html (last visited Nov.
18, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
354. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Children’s Hospitals Graduate Medical
Education Payment Program, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/childrenshospitalgme (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
355. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Primary Care Residency Expansion
(PCRE), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/grants/
medicine/pcre.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
356. See HHS PRIMER, supra note 49, at 7 (listing some of the sources
through which GME is funded).
357. See id. (noting that some of GME is funded through private sources).
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relationships with private, nonpayor institutions.358 Although a
discussion of these other programs, grants, and non-traditional
funding sources is well beyond the scope of this current Article, I
will be critiquing in a companion article a variety of
methodologies adopted by state Medicaid agencies for funding
GME and hope that this Article and its companion article will be
read in tandem for a complete reform of Medicare and Medicaid
funding of GME.
VI. Proposals
Parts II through V of this Article show how Medicare
financing of GME can significantly impact both the overall supply
as well as the geographic distribution of the physician workforce
in the United States.359 The question becomes whether and how
Medicare financing of GME can be reconfigured to achieve a more
equitable supply and distribution of physicians.360
In a study, “The Geography of Graduate Medical Education:
Imbalances Signal Need for New Distribution Policies,” published
in late 2013 in Health Affairs, researchers affiliated with George
Washington University School of Public Health and Health
Services investigated the geography of GME, including state and
regional imbalances.361 Using Medicare cost reports that teaching
hospitals submitted to CMS in FYs 2008 through 2010 as well as
2010 population data from the Census Bureau, the study authors
identified or determined, as appropriate, each U.S. teaching
hospital’s BBA-imposed resident cap, the number of residents
358. See Andrew Kiraly, Is There a Doctor in the House?, DESERT
COMPANION,
at
102
(Aug.
2013),
http://www.desertcompanion.com/
article.cfm?ArticleID=628 (describing alternative sources of funding for GME).
359. Supra Parts II–V; see also Candice Chen et al., The Redistribution of
Graduate Medical Education Positions in 2005 Failed to Boost Primary Care or
Rural Training, 32(1) HEALTH AFFAIRS 102, 102 (2013) (addressing the ways in
which GME funding affects training).
360. See generally Mullan et al., Geography, supra note 16 (asking the
question of how new distribution policies may be used to achieve a balance in
the supply of physicians).
361. See generally id. (analyzing new distribution policies to create more
equity in physician distribution and supply).
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trained by each hospital, and the number of residents trained by
each hospital over its BBA cap.362 The authors then determined
the total resident cap for all teaching hospitals in each state, the
total number of residents trained in each state, as well as total
Medicare GME payments to teaching hospitals in each state.363
Finally, the study authors calculated each state’s resident cap per
100,000 people, Medicare GME payments per person, and
average Medicare GME payments per medical resident.364
After analyzing the data, the study authors reported large
differences in states’ total numbers of Medicare-financed
residents per 100,000 population, Medicare GME payments per
person, and average Medicare GME payments per medical
resident.365 In particular, the study authors found that the
number of Medicare-financed residents per 100,000 population
ranged from 202.87 residents in the District of Columbia to 1.63
residents per 100,000 population in Montana, with a national
average of 29.31 residents per 100,000 population.366 In addition
to the District of Columbia, states with the highest ratios
included New York (77.13), Massachusetts (66.08), Rhode Island
(61.48), Pennsylvania (54.48), Michigan (53.05), and Connecticut
(49.65).367 In addition to Montana, states with the lowest ratios
included Idaho (2.24), Alaska (3.15), Wyoming (6.64), South
Dakota (8.84), and Nevada (9.10).368 Holding state populations
equal, then, the federal government finances significantly higher
numbers of residency positions in New England and the Middle
Atlantic than in the Intermountain West.369 Stated differently,
the BBA-imposed caps are lower in the Intermountain West even

362. See id. at 1916 (explaining the methods and data sources of the study).
363. See id. (elaborating on the processes of the study).
364. See id. at 1917 (detailing the final step and calculations in the study).
365. See id. (revealing the analyzed data from the study in a chart with data
from the top ten and bottom ten states).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See id. (comparing the numbers of federal government funded positions
throughout the country).
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taking into account the lower populations of many Intermountain
West states.370
In terms of Medicare GME payments per person in each state
(i.e., per state resident, not per medical resident training in a
GME program), the study authors reported a range of $172.85
per person in the District of Columbia to $1.94 per person in
Montana, with a national average of $32.31 per person.371 In
addition to the District of Columbia, states with the highest
Medicare GME payments per person included New York
($103.63), Massachusetts ($85.43), Rhode Island ($81.23), and
Michigan and Connecticut (both at $74.67).372 In addition to
Montana, states with the lowest Medicare GME payments per
person included Idaho ($2.51), Wyoming ($2.91), Alaska ($3.17),
Mississippi ($7.47), South Dakota ($9.05), and Nevada ($9.57).373
Holding state populations equal, then, the federal government
spends significantly more on GME per person in New England,
the Middle Atlantic, and Michigan compared to the South and the
Intermountain West.
In terms of average Medicare GME payments per medical
resident in each state, the study authors reported a range of
$155,135 in Connecticut to $43,908 in Wyoming, with a national
average of $112,642.374 In addition to Connecticut, states with the
highest average Medicare GME payment per medical resident
included Michigan ($141,126), New York ($139,126), North
Dakota ($137,111), Pennsylvania ($133,879), and Rhode Island
($133,615).375 In addition to Wyoming, states with the lowest
average Medicare GME payment per medical resident included
Louisiana ($63,811), Mississippi ($67,527), Hawaii ($97,744),
Alaska ($100,625), South Dakota ($102,382), Illinois ($103,944),
and Nevada ($109,514).376 Holding the number of Medicare
370. See id. (providing data showing lower BBA-imposed caps for the
Intermountain West states, such as Idaho and Nevada, than for other states).
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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funded residency positions equal, then, the federal government
pays significantly more per medical resident in New England, the
Middle Atlantic, and certain northern states, such as North
Dakota, than it does in the South or most of the West.377 After
further analyzing their data, the study authors reported that
New York received 29% of all Medicare GME funding while
twenty-nine states, including states struggling with physician
shortages, received less than 1%.378 According to the study
authors, a disproportionate amount of Medicare GME dollars are
flowing to states such as New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island, even though these three states have the highest
physician-to-population ratios and are not physician shortage
states.379
Why do these geographic imbalances in Medicare GME
funding exist? As explained in Part V, COBRA of 1986 tied most
hospitals’ per resident amounts to FY 1984 costs380 and the BBA
of 1997 capped the number of Medicare-financed residents at the
number of residents reported on teaching hospitals’ 1996 cost
reports.381 By these dates, teaching hospitals located in New
England and the Middle Atlantic had already founded and fully
grown all of their residency programs and maximized their GME
costs.382 Indeed, GME was born in New England and the Middle
377. See id. (providing the average Medicare GME payment per resident for
the states in these regions).
378. See Kathy Fackelmann, Twenty Percent of Nation’s Graduate Medical
Education Funds Go to New York While 29 States Get Less than One Percent,
Study Says, GEO. WASH. U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH & HEALTH SERVS. (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://publichealth.gwu.edu/content/twenty-percent-nation%E2%80%99sgraduate-medical-education-funds-go-new-york-while-29-states-get (last visited
Nov. 18, 2014) (explaining that northeastern states with no physician shortages
receive a disproportionate percentage of Medicare’s graduate medical education
funding) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
379. See id. (“Many Southern and Western states—which already face
shortfalls in their physician workforce—such as Montana, Idaho, Arkansas,
Wyoming, Florida and even California do not do well in terms of Medicare GME
funding under the current system, according to the authors.”).
380. See supra Part V.A.1 (explaining the system that determines a teaching
hospital’s per resident amount).
381. See supra Part V.A.2 (explaining that the number of full-time
equivalent residents is the second factor used in the Medicare payment
calculation).
382. See Mullan et al., Geography, supra note 16, at 1918 (“These data
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Atlantic almost a century before COBRA and the BBA were
enacted.383 Baltimore’s Johns Hopkins Hospital established its
first GME program—a one-year internship—in 1889,384 and
Johns Hopkins had more than ninety years to build twenty-eight
different residency programs.385 For purposes of comparison, the
geographic area that later became Las Vegas had no inhabitants
in 1889, the year Johns Hopkins founded its first GME program,
and Las Vegas was not even founded as a city until 1905.386
COBRA thus “froze” in place the high costs associated with Johns
Hopkins’ twenty-eight programs and then the BBA “cemented”
the high numbers of residents that train in these programs.387
Add to these advantages the fact that New England and the
Middle Atlantic have experienced relatively slow population
growth since COBRA and the BBA.388 The populations of New
York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania grew only by 2.1%, 3.1%,
and 3.4%, respectively, between 2000 and 2010.389 The result is
high ratios of Medicare-financed residency slots per 100,000
population, high Medicare GME payments per person, and high
average Medicare GME payments per medical resident in New
document a substantial imbalance favoring the Northeast, where residency
education first took root in the first half of the twentieth century.”).
383. See id. (“Programs in these areas were well positioned to take full
advantage of Medicare GME as it developed in the latter part of that century.”).
384. HHS PRIMER, supra note 49, at 2.
385. See House Staff Training Programs at Johns Hopkins, JOHN HOPKINS
SCH. MED., http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/som/gme/residents/programs.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014) [hereinafter JOHN HOPKINS SCH. MED.] (providing a
list of the various House Staff Training Programs available at Johns Hopkins)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
386. See RILEY MOFFAT, POPULATION HISTORY OF WESTERN U.S. CITIES &
TOWNS, 1850–1990, at 156 (1996), https://bsl.app.box.com/s/4ia5zhu2p9d56b5k
91gx (reporting that Las Vegas had zero residents in 1890 and only twenty-five
residents in 1900).
387. See Mullan et al., Geography, supra note 16, at 1918–20 (“These
payment advantages were essentially frozen in place by the 1997 Medicare
GME caps, cementing the geography of the GME system that was largely built
in the first half of the twentieth century and carrying that geography forward
into the twenty-first century.”).
388. See id. at 1920 (comparing slow population growth in New England and
the Middle Atlantic with the greater population growth in the South and the
West).
389. Id.
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England and the Middle Atlantic and, of course, fewer reports of
physician shortages.390
On the other hand, the populations of many states in the
South and West grew dramatically in the late twentieth century
and early twenty-first century.391 From 1990 to 2000, for example,
the populations of Nevada, Georgia, Texas, Florida, California,
and Alabama grew by approximately 66%, 26%, 23%, 23%, 14%,
and 10% respectively.392 The population growth in Nevada was
particularly startling.393 In 1990, Nevada had 1,201,833 people.394
By 2000, the Silver State had grown to 1,998,257 people, a 66.3%
increase and the highest growth rate in the United States.395 The
following decade, from 2000 to 2010, the populations of Nevada,
Texas, Georgia, Florida, California, and Alabama continued to
grow by 35.1%, 20.6%, 18.3%, 17.6%, 10%, and 7.5%,
respectively.396 To respond to the increased health care needs
associated with their growing populations, these and other states
located in the South and West would like to build new or expand
existing UME schools and GME programs.397 And herein lies the
390. See id. (“In some cases, either a state will have to fund new GME
positions, or many of its new graduates will have to leave the state to find
residency positions.”).
391. See Population Change and Distribution: 1990 to 2000, NAT’L ATLAS,
http://www.nationalatlas.gov/articles/people/ a_popchange.html#t1 (last updated
Jan. 14, 2013) (last visited Aug. 30, 2014) (highlighting population size and
distribution changes in the United States that occurred from 1990 to 2000) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
392. Id.
393. See id. (“Growth in the West was led by Nevada, now the country’s
fastest-growing State for each of the past four decades.”).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000
TO 2010, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS
2 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf (discussing population changes from 2000 to 2010
for states and other geographic levels); Mullan et al., supra note 16, at 1920
(reporting the percentage growth rates of Texas, Florida, and California from
2000 to 2010).
397. See Inglehart, Uncertain Future, supra note 50, at 1342 (“Because of
the cap on Medicare’s payments, the expanding number of U.S. medical school
graduates, and the continuing influx of some 7000 international medical
graduates in search of GME posts every year, before long there will be too few
positions to train them all.”).
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problem: Not only does Congress prohibit Medicare financing of
new residency slots within existing medical residency programs,
but CMS also limits the number of years that new medical
residency programs located in urban areas have to start and
build all of their training programs.398
An example may be used to illustrate the latter limitation.
Assume that a hypothetical teaching hospital located in a
growing population center in the South or West began training
residents in a new family medicine program on July 1, 2013.
Further assume that the teaching hospital wishes to slowly and
carefully build its training programs and that it would like to
have a few years of family medicine under its belt before
beginning a new general surgery program on July 1, 2015, and
before beginning a new sports medicine program on July 1, 2017,
and a new dermatology program on July 1, 2019. CMS will close
the five-year cap-building window for all four of these new
training programs on June 30, 2018.399 By this date, the family
medicine program will have had five years to establish itself, the
general surgery program will have had three years to establish
itself, the sports medicine program will have had one year to
establish itself, and the dermatology program will be one year
away from its founding. Thus, none of the dermatology residents
will be included in the hospital’s resident cap, and it is likely that
none of the other three programs, but especially the sports
medicine and general surgery programs, will be running at their
maximum capacity by June 30, 2018.400 Again, compare the
experience of this hypothetical teaching hospital to Johns
Hopkins Hospital, which had approximately one century (from
1889, the date of its first internship’s founding, to 1986, the date
of COBRA’s enactment, and 1997, the date of the BBA’s
398. See supra Part V.A.2 (“[T]he BBA-established caps apply less
stringently to hospitals located in rural areas.”).
399. See 2014 Proposed Rule, supra note 234, at 28146 (providing a similar
example).
400. See Mullan et al., Geography, supra note 16, at 1920 (“Governors and
legislators who once knew little about Medicare GME are now aware that state
investments in new or expanded medical schools face a substantial barrier
because their residency program base is small and they lack Medicare GME
funding to expand rapidly.”).
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enactment) to build and grow in terms of the number of specialty
training programs, the total number of residents in those training
programs, and the total costs associated with those training
programs.401 This example shows how, as applied, the statutes
and regulations governing Medicare payments to teaching
hospitals for the costs of their GME discriminate against existing
and new teaching hospitals located in growing population centers
in the United States.402
According to Fitzhugh Mullan, the lead study author of the
Health Affairs study, the federal statutes and regulations
governing Medicare financing of GME do “affect access to health
care.”403 Mullan further explains that, “Unless the GME payment
system is reformed, the skewed payments will continue to
promote imbalances across the country.”404 Mullan concludes that
“because the majority of newly minted physicians set up a
practice near where they are trained . . . it is important that
states with rural and growing populations receive appropriate
support for starting and maintaining residency programs.”405
This Article thus proposes a reconfiguration of the current
methodology used to calculate Medicare financing of teaching
hospitals’ GME costs.406 As described in more detail below, this
proposed reconfiguration is designed to boost residency training
in physician shortage areas and in growing population centers.407
401. See id. at 1918–20 (explaining how residency programs in the
Northeast were in a better position than programs in other regions to take full
advantage of Medicare GME); HHS Primer, supra note 49, at 2 (identifying the
early establishment of Johns Hopkins’s first GME program); JOHN HOPKINS SCH.
MED., supra note 385 (listing the current twenty-eight residency programs
available at Johns Hopkins).
402. See Mullan et al., Geography, supra note 16, at 1918–20 (describing
how the Medicare GME favors residency programs in states that had a high
density of residents at the time Medicare GME was established).
403. Fackelmann, supra note 378 (quoting and summarizing Mullan).
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. See id. (“The study adds to the evidence suggesting that the current
system of allocating graduate medical education or GME money is based on an
inflexible and outdated method, one that contributes to large imbalances in
payments and a growing shortfall of physicians in some areas of the country.”).
407. Id.
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Let us begin with the PRA, which is the first factor in the
formula used to calculate Medicare payments to a teaching
hospital for the costs of its DGME.408 Under current rules, each
hospital’s PRA is calculated by dividing allowable DGME costs
accrued during a base year that is thirty-one years old (FY 1984)
by the base period’s average number of full-time equivalent
residents working in all areas of the hospital complex, and then
updating that amount for inflation.409 Remember, too, that
Congress froze inflation updates on PRAs for non-primary care
residents and non-obstetrics and gynecology residents in FYs
1994 and 1995 to encourage support for primary care physicians
even though current data in many states, such as Nevada, show
significant shortages of specialists.410
This method of calculating PRAs is problematic for several
reasons. First, remember that financial arrangements between
teaching hospitals and medical schools historically have varied
widely, and that the lack of consistency in these arrangements
has made it almost impossible to accurately and appropriately
determine or allocate GME costs.411 For example, the costs
associated with faculty supervision of residents may be wholly
assigned to the affiliated medical school in one arrangement and
assigned in whole or in part to the teaching hospital in a second
arrangement.412 Teaching hospitals that could easily identify
408. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(2) (2012) (describing how the per resident
amount is determined for each hospital).
409. See id. (detailing the PRA calculation); 42 C.F.R. § 413.77 (2013)
(providing further details on the PRA calculation).
410. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(2)(D)(ii) (providing the freeze in update
provision for fiscal years 1994 and 1995); 42 C.F.R. § 413.77(c)(2) (providing
further implementation of the freeze in update provision).
411. See HHS PRIMER, supra note 49, at 6 (describing several common
inconsistencies in identifying and allocating GME costs that create variation in
per resident cost amounts reported by teaching hospitals and medical schools).
412. See id. (explaining that this inconsistency results in wide reporting
variations). Indeed, there is a saying in academic medicine that “If you’ve seen
one academic medical center, you’ve seen one academic medical center.” See,
e.g., Darrell G. Kirch, A Word from the President: Realizing Just How Much We
Have in Common, AAMC REP. (2011) (emphasizing that the saying is very
common). No two academic medical centers are alike, which makes the provision
of accounting, legal, and other services to academic medical centers very
difficult.
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their GME costs were able to lock into place high PRAs. 413
Teaching hospitals whose GME costs were administratively
difficult to follow were stuck with low PRAs.414 The result is wide
variations in PRAs across training institutions, even if labor and
other costs are similar.415 As the Health Affairs study shows,
average Medicare GME payments per resident range from a low
of $43,908 in Wyoming to $155,074 in Connecticut, with a
national average of $112,642.416
Because some allowable GME costs (e.g., accreditation fees)
do not vary, while other costs (e.g., resident stipends, teaching
faculty salaries, and GME clerical personnel salaries) vary by
region based on the cost of labor, the cost of living, and other
similar factors, while still other costs (e.g., allocated institutional
overhead costs, including electricity) vary by teaching hospital
based on heating, cooling, and technology needs and by regional
energy costs, and still other costs (e.g., malpractice insurance
premiums) vary by region, even within the same specialty,417
PRAs certainly will not and should not be the same at every
teaching hospital.418 That said, a three-point-five-fold variation in
per medical resident payments (i.e., $43,908 in Wyoming to
$155,074 in Connecticut) likely would not exist if physician
workforce analysts could determine a standard method of
413. See HHS PRIMER, supra note 49, at 16 (describing the teaching
hospitals receiving high GME subsidies).
414. See id. (describing the teaching hospitals receiving low GME subsidies).
415. See id. at 15–16 (“Because of large variations in historical per resident
cost amount across training institutions (based on inconsistencies in identifying
and allocating such costs), total GME subsidies to teaching hospitals by
Medicare range widely—from about $60,000 to $120,000 per resident per
year.”).
416. See Mullan et al., Geography, supra note 16, at 1917 (describing several
large differences between states in the number of residents funded by Medicare
and the number of residents per 100,000 population).
417. See Alicia Gallegos, Malpractice Premiums Steady in 2013, Vary Widely
by Region, OB.GYN. NEWS (Oct. 14, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.obgynnews.
com/index.php?id=11146&cHash=071010&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=218953
(last
visited Nov. 18, 2014) (noting substantial variation across regions with respect
to same-specialty malpractice insurance premiums) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
418. See id. (providing reasons why PRAs will not be the same at every
teaching hospital).
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identifying and allocating allowable GME costs at every teaching
hospital.419
My proposal with respect to PRAs thus has two parts. First,
if physician workforce analysts could determine a standard
method of identifying and allocating all DGME costs within all
teaching hospital-medical school arrangements, then this new,
standard methodology should be used and the thirty-one year old
PRA should be discarded. More specifically, the current statutory
and regulatory provisions governing PRA determinations set
forth at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(2) and 42 C.F.R. § 413.77 should
be deleted and the new, standard method should be described at
these provisions.
Second, if a new, standard methodology for identifying and
allocating DGME costs cannot be identified due to the complexity
and
uniqueness
of
teaching
hospital-medical
school
arrangements, then a new PRA methodology should be created.
One option is to start with a base PRA that is equal to the current
national average ($112,642 per resident)420 and to adjust that
amount up or down at each teaching hospital based on relative
labor costs, costs of living, and other factors that vary by region.
In a proposed rule, CMS could tentatively identify the factors to
be used to adjust the base PRA as well as the specific wage,
consumer, and other price indices that should be used to calculate
such adjustments. The public input received through this noticeand-comment rulemaking process could be used to finalize these
factors and indices. In the same proposed rule, CMS should also
propose to delete the PRA inflation update freezes on nonprimary care and non-obstetrician and gynecology residents in
light of the number of states, such as Nevada, that have extreme
specialist (in addition to generalist) physician shortages, as well
as low numbers of residency positions in specialty areas.421
On July 29, 2014, after the above proposal was drafted, the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a report titled “Graduate
419. See Mullan et al., Geography, supra note 16, at 1917 (describing the
wide variation between per medical resident payments in Wyoming and
Connecticut).
420. See id. (stating the national average GME payment per resident).
421. See Robison, supra note 4 (explaining the severity and extent of doctor
shortages in Nevada).
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Medical Education That Meets the Nation’s Health Care
Needs.”422 In that report, the IOM recommends replacing the
separate DGME and IME payments with one payment based on a
national PRA with a geographic adjustment.423 A portion of that
IOM recommendation—the idea of a national PRA with a
geographic adjustment—is very similar to the proposal in this
Article.
Let us now move to the second factor in the formula that is
used to calculate Medicare financing of DGME: the weighted
average number of full-time equivalent residents training in an
approved medical residency program and working in the hospital
complex or, under certain circumstances, non-hospital
locations.424 Remember, the number of allopathic and osteopathic
residents that teaching hospitals may claim for DGME (and for
IME) is generally capped at the number of residents counted on a
hospital’s most recent cost report ending on or before December
31, 1996.425 Added by Congress in the BBA, these allopathic and
osteopathic resident caps responded to then-current projections of
widespread physician surpluses across the United States.426 Two
decades later, many states in the South and West are facing
serious physician shortages and the entire United States is
projected to face a physician shortage by the end of the first
quarter of the twenty-first century.427
Policymakers have several options for confronting this
challenge. One option is to leave the caps in place, thus
422. INST. OF MED., GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION THAT MEETS THE
NATION’S HEALTH NEEDS (July 29, 2014).
423 Id. at 5-22, Recommendation 4.
424. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(4) (2012) (describing the role of the second
factor in the formula); 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.78–81 (2013) (providing further detail on
how the second factor determines Medicare financing of DGME).
425. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(4)(F) (detailing the cap); 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.79(c)(2)(i) (reiterating the details of the cap).
426. See, e.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 54, at 8 (“Economists and policy
experts in the early to mid-1990s were projecting physician shortages.”).
427. See AM. MED. ASS’N, THE CALL TO INCREASE GRADUATE MEDICAL
FUNDING, supra note 5, at 1 (“Many authorities agree that by 2025 the United
States will face a shortage of physicians to meet the needs of a growing and
aging U.S. population.”); Weigley et al., supra note 6 (discussing concentration
of physician shortages in the South and West).
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perpetuating sub-optimal physician supply and distribution in
the United States. Given the current and pending physician
shortages across the United States, especially in growing
population centers in the United States South and West, this
option should receive no further consideration. Current federal
statutes and regulations governing the calculation of Medicare
payments to teaching hospitals discriminate against teaching
hospitals located in growing population centers and these federal
statutes and regulations cannot be maintained.
A second option is to maintain Medicare financing of GME at
current levels but to reallocate residency slots among hospitals
based on resident-to-population ratios or based on teaching
hospital proposals regarding GME performance and innovation.
In its July 29, 2014, report, the IOM recommends a variation on
this option; that is, the IOM recommends the creation of a GME
Transformation Fund that will “finance initiatives to develop and
evaluate innovative GME programs, to determine and validate
appropriate GME performance measures, to pilot alternative
GME payment methods, and to award new Medicare-funded
GME training positions in priority disciplines and geographic
areas.”428 Note, however, that this IOM approach will not
increase Medicare or other government financing of GME. This
option will simply reallocate payments from some teaching
hospitals to others based on need, performance, innovation, or a
combination of those factors.429 This option is certainly more just,
or fair, than option one. However, this option will not cure the
nation’s current and looming physician shortages.
A third option, recommended by this Article, is for Congress
to amend 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(4) (and for CMS to amend 42
C.F.R. § 413.79(c)) to remove the caps for certain teaching
hospitals located in states with physician shortages that have low
resident-to-population ratios. For example, this third option could
be implemented by removing the statutory caps for teaching
hospitals located in states that fall below the national average for
428. INST. OF MED., GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION THAT MEETS THE
NATION’S HEALTH CARE NEEDS, supra note 422, at 5-18 Recommendation 3.
429. Id. at 5-13, Recommendation 1 (recommending the maintenance of
GME support at the “current aggregate amount”).
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physician-to-population ratios and to allow teaching hospitals in
those states to apply for additional Medicare-financed residency
slots up to a certain amount, perhaps the national average of
residency slots. In 2012, the most recent year for which data are
available, there was a national average of 260.5 active physicians
per 100,000 population in the United States, ranging from a high
of 421.5 in Massachusetts to a low of 180.8 in Mississippi. 430
Thus, teaching hospitals in states with physician-to-population
ratios lower than the national average (i.e., Mississippi, currently
ranked last in the relative number of physicians, through
California, which currently has 257.6 physicians per 100,000
population)431 could be authorized to apply for additional
residency slots until the state in which the teaching hospitals are
located achieves the current national average of residents; that is,
36.6 per 100,000 population.432 Remember, however, that a
variety of factors other than current population affect
determinations regarding optimal and equitable physician supply
and distribution.433 Thus, CMS could offer the simple and
straightforward “population” model described above as one option
in a proposed rule, but CMS could seek comment on the use of
other mathematical models with which the government is already
familiar. These include, but are not limited to, the Physician
Supply Projection Model, the GME Model, and the Physician
Requirements Model.434 Each of these models focuses on one or
more of the other non-population factors described in Part III
that affect optimal and equitable physician supply and
distribution.
In structuring a process pursuant to which qualified teaching
hospitals could apply for additional residency slots, CMS could
430. AAMC, 2013 PHYSICIAN DATA BOOK, supra note 7, at 4.
431. Id. at 9.
432. Id. at 32.
433. See AMA, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 7, at 64 (“It is
recognized that the quality and quantity of health care are predicated on a
variety of factors such as medical need for services, demographic composition,
geographical location, and socioeconomic variables, among others.”).
434. See, e.g., THE COMING SHORTAGE, supra note 55, at 54 (identifying and
summarizing a number of different models); GMENAC REPORT, supra note 49,
at 50 (same).
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build on the application process it implemented following the
enactment of the ACA, which allowed certain teaching hospitals
(i.e., those teaching hospitals located in states with resident-topopulation ratios in the lowest quartile, as well as teaching
hospitals located in states that were in the top ten in terms of the
ratio of HPSA population to total population, as well as hospitals
located in rural areas) to apply for a discrete number of residency
slots that were being redistributed from teaching hospitals that
were not using all of their slots.435 I applaud ACA’s attempt to
redistribute resident slots to geographic areas with low residentto-population ratios and to HPSAs and rural areas.436 The
discrete redistributions that occurred, however, were insufficient
to effect the large-scale changes needed to remedy current and
looming physician shortages.437 For example, seven teaching
hospitals located in Georgia and eight teaching hospitals located
in Arizona did not receive any additional residency slots, even
though Georgia and Arizona are located in the bottom quartile of
states in terms of their resident-to-population ratios.438 In the
end, only fifty-eight teaching hospitals across the United States
received additional residency slots as a result of the ACA
reallocation process.439
In constructing an application process, CMS should allow for
applications not only by current teaching hospitals, but also by
new teaching hospitals that would like to build new medical
435. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 5503 (2012)) (providing the “Distribution of Additional Residency
Positions” provision); 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(m) (2013) (same).
436. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 5503 (providing the
provision that attempts to redistribute residency slots to area in need).
437. See Kiraly, supra note 358, at 102 (“Congress recently [in ACA] tossed
Nevada an extra handful of residencies, but it’s a drop in the proverbial IV bag.”
(quoting Dr. John Packham of the University of Nevada School of Medicine)).
438. See Direct Graduate Medical Education (DGME), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERV. (Aug. 4, 2014 4:06 PM), www.cms.gov/Medicare/MedicareFee-for-Service-Payment/AcutelnpatientPPS/dgme.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2014) (providing an excel spreadsheet listing provider numbers and their
corresponding IME and DGME reduction amount) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
439. Id.
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residency training programs. Remember that urban teaching
hospitals with new medical residency training programs that
otherwise would have caps of zero due to a lack of residents at the
time Congress set the caps in 1997 may receive a cap adjustment
based on the sum of the products of the highest number of FTE
residents in any program year during the fifth year of the
hospital’s first new program’s existence and the number of years
in which residents are expected to complete the program based on
the minimum IRP for each type of program.440
In its proposed rule, CMS should seek comment on an
amendment to the second half of 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1), the
regulation that establishes the five-year, urban hospital, capbuilding window, that would provide for a longer cap-building
window as well as a cap-building window that begins running
from the start of each new residency program.441 That is, CMS
should seek comment on the time it actually takes to found and
grow a high-quality and efficiently-run residency program. Based
on my decades of experience representing academic medical
centers in a variety of civil, regulatory, and transactional
matters, I estimate this time to be in the absolute minimum
range of six to eight years, depending on the specialty program
and its IRP. As it currently stands, the five-year cap-building
window is shorter than the time it takes some specialists,
including neurosurgeons, to complete their residencies.442 That is,
CMS caps the number of Medicare-financed residents in new
neurosurgery programs two years before the first class of
neurosurgeons ever complete their training.443 In its proposed
rule, CMS should solicit comments that specifically address the
ways in which current residency programs may be limited via the
440. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1) (explaining when a hospital’s FTE cap may
be adjusted).
441. See id. (detailing the regulation that the proposed rule should amend).
442. See, e.g., Neurosurgery Resident Curriculum, BRIGHAM & WOMEN’S
HOSP., http://www.brighamandwomens.org/Departments_and_Services/neuro
surgery/residencyprogram/Residentcurriculum.aspx (last updated July 16, 2014)
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (providing a seven-year neurosurgery residency) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
443. See id. (providing an example of the length of time it takes
neurosurgeons to complete their training); 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1) (2013)
(providing the five-year cap-building window).
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five-year cap-building window as well as the optimal number of
cap-building years.444
In addition, CMS should amend the second half of 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.79(e)(1) to mirror, in part, the cap-building window that
applies to rural hospitals.445 Under current law, if a rural hospital
participates in a new training program, the rural hospital’s
resident cap is calculated using the highest number of FTE
residents in any program year during the fifth year of each new
program’s existence (and not the fifth year of the first new
program’s existence).446 Ignoring the current five-year length of
rural hospitals’ cap-building windows (which should be amended
to mirror any longer cap-building window that would apply to
urban hospitals under the proposal set forth above), note how
rural hospitals’ cap-building windows begin at the start of each
new training program, not at the start of a hospital’s first new
training program.447 Applying this rule to urban hospitals would
allow experienced teaching hospital administrators to stagger the
starts of multiple training programs as necessary to prevent
administrative and cost overload without the cap-building
window closing prior to the beginning of later training
programs.448
Finally, the proposals described above will increase Medicare
expenditures for GME. To finance these proposals, one option is
for Congress to create an all-payer trust that would be funded by
fees imposed on private health insurers, which also benefit from
GME.449 These trust funds would be used to cover the costs
444. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1) (providing the five-year cap-building
window currently regulating residency programs).
445. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(3) (explaining rural hospital participation in
new medical residency training programs).
446. See id. (providing the described provision for rural hospitals).
447. See id. (explaining the manner in which the rural hospital provision
differs from the provisions for other hospitals).
448. See BRIGHAM & WOMEN’S HOSP., supra note 442 (providing a seven-year
neurosurgery residency that would exceed the current cap-building window); 42
C.F.R. § 413.79(e)(1) (providing the five-year cap-building window).
449. Contra INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION THAT
MEETS THE NATION’S HEALTH CARE NEEDS, supra note 428, at 5-13,
Recommendation 1 (recommending instead that Medicare financing of GME be
maintained at “the current aggregate amount (i.e., the total of indirect medical
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associated with the expansion of existing residency programs and
the building of new residency programs. The IOM’s recent report,
which proposes to modernize GME payments “based on
performance, to ensure program oversight and accountability,
and to incentivize innovation in the content and financing of
GME,”450 certainly could be incorporated into the design and
implementation of this all-payer trust. That is, trust funds could
be distributed in part based on GME performance and
innovation.
Versions of all-payer trusts have been proposed in the past.
In 2001, Representative Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) introduced the
All-Payer Graduate Medical Act of 2001.451 This bill would have
amended the Internal Revenue Code to create a Health Care
Workforce Trust that would have been funded by a fee equal to
one percent of the premiums received under accident and health
insurance policies.452 Trust funds, estimated to total
approximately four billion dollars, would have been used to
finance DGME and IME payments to teaching hospitals.453 A
second illustrative bill, the Medical Education Trust Fund Act,
was introduced by Senators Jack Reed (D-RI) and Hillary Clinton
(D-NY) in 2001.454 This bill would have required insured and selfinsured health plans to contribute a 1.5% assessment on health
insurance premiums455 to a newly created Medical Education

education and direct graduate medical education expenditures in an agreed-on
base year, adjusted annually for inflation).”).
450. Id. at 5-13, Recommendation 1.
451. See H.R. 2178, 107th Cong. (2001) (“To amend the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 and title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for
comprehensive financing for graduate medical education.”).
452. See id. § 102 (describing the provisions for the financing of the fund).
453. See id. § 111 (“Formula payments regarding private-sector share of
costs of graduate medical education.”).
454. See S. 743, 107th Cong. (2001) (“To establish a medical trust fund, and
for other purposes.”).
455. See id. § 5 (providing the requirements imposed on both insured and
self-self-insured health plans).
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Trust.456 Trust funds then would have been used to pay teaching
hospitals for costs directly and indirectly associated with GME.457
The bills were introduced in 2001; that is, immediately
following two decades of physician surplus projections458 and
immediately before workforce analysts came to their current
consensus
regarding
widespread
physician
shortage
projections.459 In 2001, it was easy for Congress to cave to insurer
objections to these bills without substantial evidence of current
and looming physician shortages.460 Today, the result should be
very different.461
VII. Conclusion
This Article has carefully examined the complex relationship
between population growth, physician shortages, and Medicare
financing of GME. One conclusion is that current rules governing
the calculation of Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for the
costs of their GME are based on cost, population, and other data
that are no longer relevant. A second conclusion is that the
application of these formulas discriminates in favor of the
nation’s oldest teaching hospitals, most of which are located in
New England and the Middle Atlantic, and against current and
456. See id. § 2 (amending the Social Security Act by establishing a Medical
Education Trust Fund).
457. See id. (describing the payments made to medical schools).
458. See supra notes 56–66 and accompanying text (naming several different
public and private bodies that predicted physician surpluses).
459. See, e.g., AAMC, RECENT STUDIES, supra note 68, at 1–22 (listing dozens
of state and specialty-specific reports published since 2000 that project
significant physician shortages by the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first
century); Iglehart, Uncertain Future, supra note 50, at 1341 (referring to these
reports).
460. See supra notes 56–66 and accompanying text (providing numerous
sources of physician surplus projections made during the two decades prior to
the year 2001).
461. See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM, HEALTH
INSURANCE COMPANY CEOS’ TOTAL COMPENSATION IN 2013 (reporting annual
compensation for health insurance company CEOs at $30.7 million (Aetna), $17
million (Wellpoint), $14.5 million (Centene), $13.5 million (Cigna), $12.1 million
(United Health), and $8.8 million (Humana)).
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future teaching hospitals located in growing population centers,
especially regions in the South and West. To remedy these
inequities, this Article proposes a new structure for calculating
Medicare payments to teaching hospitals that takes into account
current GME costs, current geographic imbalances in physician
and resident supply and distribution, and current and future
population growth. If implemented by Congress and CMS, these
proposals will boost residency training in physician shortage
areas and in growing population centers and will improve access
to generalist and specialist physicians across the United States.

